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Abstract
The study of humility has progressed slowly due to lack of theory and measurement
issues. In the present dissertation, I review the literature on humility and propose a
theory of relational humility. The model conceptualizes humility as a personality
judgment, aligning its study with a large literature that spans social and personality
psychology. Then, in four studies, I examined initial evidence for the theoretical model.
In Study 1 (N=300), I created the Relational Humility Scale (RHS) and evaluated its
items using exploratory factor analysis. The RHS was found to have 3 subscales: Global
Humility, Superiority, and Accurate View of Self. In Study 2, its structure was replicated
on an independent sample (N = 196). In Study 3, I conducted a longitudinal study of
undergraduate students (N =84) in forming groups. As predicated, trait humility was
related to acceptance and status in the group, as well as other personality traits related to
humility such as narcissism and agreeableness; however, self-enhancement of humility
(i.e., overestimating one’s humility) was not related to other correlates of low humility.
In Study 4 (N=123), I examined humility in the context of conflict and forgiveness. As
predicated, humility judgments were related to changes in forgiveness over time, as well
as viewing an offender as spiritually similar. I then discuss implications of these findings
for the study of humility from a relational perspective.

Chapter 1: Introduction
Humility is a virtue that has been written about for millennia. A number of
writers and leaders have referred to the importance of humility in the past century. In his
best seller, Good to Great, Collins (2001) found that exceptional leaders, able to take
their companies into an era of financial prosperity and growth that outlasted the leader’s
tenure with the company, possessed two paradoxical qualities: relentless will and
humility. Similarly, a number of popular writers have emphasized the theme of servant
leadership, of which humility is a core quality (e.g., Blanchard, 2003; Greenleaf,
1977/2002).
Despite the popular interest in humility, the study of humility has been thwarted
by definition and measurement problems. The aim of this current dissertation is to
review the various approaches of studying humility and to suggest an alternative strategy,
called relational humility, which defines and measures humility as a personality
judgment—namely, the degree to which a person attributes humility to another person.
This dissertation is structured in three parts. In Chapter 2, I present a pointed
review of how humility has been measured. I also describe a model of relational humility
and use it to propose a research agenda. I intend Chapter 2 to be a stand-alone review
paper modeled on a review that might be published in a journal like the Journal of
Positive Psychology. I attempt to demonstrate my familiarity with the general literature
in the area that informs my empirical studies.
From my review of the literature, I conclude that in order for the study of humility
to advance, greater innovation is needed in both (a) theory and (b) measurement. To

1

address the former, in Chapter 3, I propose a theory of relational humility. I designed
Chapter 3 to be a theoretical that might appear in a journal like Current Directions in
Psychological Science. To provide research related to the latter aim (i.e., measurement),
in Chapter 4, I present four programmatic empirical studies aimed at establishing the
initial psychometric adequacy of the Relational Humility Scale (RHS), a measure of
humility judgments, and at providing initial evidence for the proposed model of
Relational Humility. I model Chapter 4 on a multiple-study article that might appear in a
journal like the Journal of Personality Assessment. In Chapter 5, I provide a general
discussion, which encompasses a discussion of Chapter 2-4.
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Chapter 2: Review of the Literature
The increased popularity of positive psychology in recent years has provided a
platform to consider the study of virtues as a legitimate topic of psychological study
(Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Indeed, the study of many virtues such as altruism
(Batson, Ahmad, Lishner, & Tsang, 2005), forgiveness (Fincham & Beach, 2007),
gratitude (Emmons & McCullough, 2004; Tsang, 2007), hope (Snyder, Rand, & Sigmon,
2002), courage (Lopez, 2007), and optimism (Carver & Scheier, 1994; Vollmann,
Renner, & Weber, 2007) is thriving. In stark contrast, the study of humility has not been
widely embraced (cf. Rowatt et al., 2006).
There are two reasons for the slow pace of humility research. The first reason is
that researchers have not clearly defined humility. Typically, they have defined it in
terms of what it is not, and they have not differentiated it from some closely related
constructs. However, consistent with the philosophical assumption of positive
psychology, I believe that the absence of something negative does not necessarily imply
the presence of something positive. Thus, humility is not just the absence of narcissism,
conceit, or arrogance (Tangney, 2005). Nor is it merely behaving meekly due to having a
low self-esteem.
Likewise, most humility researchers have distinguished humility from modesty
(cf. Rowatt et al., 2006). Peterson and Seligman (2004) described modesty as a style of
presentation does not necessarily coincide with humility. They said, ―[M]odesty … can
be consistent with an inner sense of humility but can also arise for other reasons, such as
situational demands or pressures‖ (p. 463). Tangney (2005) also differentiated modesty
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from humility, because modesty only overlaps with one aspect of her definition of
humility: having a moderate or accurate view of self. Modesty does not overlap much
with the other five aspects of her definition of humility: acknowledging limitations,
openness to new ideas, perspective of abilities and accomplishments in relation to the big
picture, low self-focus, and a valuing of all things.
When it comes to defining humility in positive terms, definitions have included a
wide range of qualities. Some definitions refer to humility as people’s view of
themselves. For example, humble people are said to be those who have a moderate or
accurate view of themselves (e.g., Baumeister, & Exline, 2002; Emmons, 1999; Rowatt,
Ottenbreit, Nesselroade, & Cunningham, 2002; Sandage & Wiens, 2001; Tangney, 2000).
Humble people are said to be less inclined to distort information to make themselves feel
better (i.e., to self-enhance; Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Such a definition overlaps with
definitions of modesty. For example, Sedikides and colleagues (2007) define modesty as
having a moderate or accurate view of oneself—not too high or too low, but just right
(for a review on modesty, see Sedikides, Gregg, & Hart, 2007). Such just right
definitions are difficult to measure in positive terms. For instance, measures of an
accurate view of self tend actually to measure various degrees of self-enhancement or
self-deprecation. However, as I will discuss later, the absence of self-enhancement does
not necessarily imply the presence of humility.
Other definitions of humility discuss a variety of interpersonal qualities. For
instance, humility has been said to involve the presence of empathy, gentleness, respect,
equality, valuing of others, and the absence of controllingness (Sandage, 1999). Humility
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has also be said to involve gratitude (Emmons, 2007); sharing the spotlight, and
acknowledging mistakes (Exline & Geyer, 2004; Tangney, 2000; Vera & RodriguezLopez, 2000); openness to ideas of other people and cultures (Gantt, 1967; Harrell &
Bond, 2006; Morris, Brotheridge, & Urbanski, 2005; Neuringer, 1991; Tangney, 2000;
Templeton, 1995); and surrender and obedience to God or the transcendent (Emmons &
Kneezel, 2005; Murray, 2005; Powers, Nam, Rowatt, & Hill, 2007). However, it is not
clear which of these qualities constitute the core of humility, and which qualities are
simply related to humility in some people some of the time (hence positively correlated).
The second reason that progress from the study of humility has been slow is that
researchers have not agreed on an acceptable way to measure humility. Self-reports of
humility are thought to suffer a problem that inherently threatens their validity. In Figure
1, I illustrate the problem. Three people with different levels of actual humility might
report the same score on a humility measure. Someone with low to average humility may
self-enhance, for people tend to self-enhance on evaluative traits (John & Robbins, 1993).
In an extreme example, a narcissist is likely to self-enhance a great deal, for selfenhancement is a cardinal quality of narcissists (Wallace, Ready, & Weitenhagen, 2009).
Conversely, people who are actually humble may sense that claiming to be humble would
be immodest, not humble. Thus they may underreport their humility. This ―modesty
effect‖ has yet to be empirically demonstrated, but if it exists, it would severely
undermine the validity of self-reports of humility, at least at the high end of the spectrum.
Despite the lack of empirical evidence of the non-valid nature of self-reports of humility
(e.g., what is the standard of true humility against which self-reports could be judged?),
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Figure 1. Illustration of the Modesty Effect for Humility Self-Reports
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some researchers have been skeptical about the validity of self-reports of humility. In
fact, the problem led Tangney (2005) to conclude that humility may be a trait that cannot
be measured validly with self-reports. Accordingly, researchers have explored alternative
strategies.
We have two primary purposes of the current dissertation. First, I seek to provide
a pointed review of the empirical literature on the measurement of humility. Specifically,
I critique four methods that have been used to study humility: self-reports, social
comparisons of self to others, an implicit association test of humility versus arrogance,
and informant ratings of humility. Second, I seek to elaborate theoretically on the latter
approach. The method of having informants make ratings of a target’s humility has
sometimes been used reflexively to adduce evidence of criterion-validity for other
measures of humility (e.g., de Vries, Lee, & Ashton, 2008; Rowatt et al., 2006). I think
the approach deserves consideration in its own right. Namely, later in this dissertation, I
will define humility as a personality judgment. The definition implies that familiar
theory and methods of studying personality judgments can be used to study humility. I
discuss some of the implications of the theoretical shift from thinking about humility as a
trait—potentially accessible through self-reports, social comparisons, or implicit
associations—to thinking about humility as a personality judgment. I conclude the
dissertation by suggesting a program of research to accelerate our understanding of
humility into a period of increased empirical exploration using different perspectives,
measurement strategies, and conceptualizations than have been frequently employed in
the past.
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Methodological Critique of Measurement of Humility
In the current section, I review four methods that have been used to measure
humility: self-reports, social comparisons of self to others, the implicit association test of
humility versus arrogance, and informant reports of humility of a target person. For each
method, I consider evidence for the reliability and construct validity of the specific
measurement strategy as well as strengths and limitations of the approach.
Self-Report Measures of Humility
Self-report measures have been relied on heavily within personality research. In
many studies they are the only measures used (Vazire, 2006). Self-reports are always
suspect because motivations and self-presentational styles are not necessarily known and
can distort the measurement of the ―true‖ depiction of the trait. However, evaluative
traits, in which there is high social value for being seen a virtuous, are particularly
susceptible to distortion. A threat to the validity of self-reports is that individuals tend to
self-enhance when they complete self-reports of evaluative traits such as humility
(Asendorpf & Ostendorf, 1998). As illustrated in Figure 1, another issue even more
troublesome, threatens the validity of humility self-reports. As I described above,
because self-enhancement is a cardinal quality of narcissism, narcissists may report high
humility (while in fact being almost the antithesis of being humble; Rowatt et al., 2006).
In addition, people who are genuinely humble may not self-enhance at all (Peterson &
Seligman, 2004). In fact, they may under-report their humility because they sense that
claiming to be very humble would be immodest, akin to bragging about their humility.
Therefore, self-reports of humility might, in fact, be even more difficult to trust that self-
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reports of other evaluative traits. For example, whereas reporting oneself as truthful is to
report on an evaluative trait that is socially desirable, to report oneself as humble is also
inherently paradoxical. Again, such problems with self-report measures of humility—
distortion and inherent paradox of claiming humility—led Tangney (2005) to conclude
that ―humility may represent a rare personality construct that is simply unamenable to
direct self-report methods‖ (p. 415).
Despite the strong warnings by humility researchers, self-report measures of
humility have been developed. In the present dissertation, I review the two most
frequently used measures: the modestly/humility subscale (MH) of the Values in Action
(VIA) Strengths Inventory (Peterson & Seligman, 2004) and the Honesty-Humility (HH)
subscale of the HEXACO Personality Inventory (Lee & Ashton, 2004). Only the
development of the HH has been published in peer reviewed articles.
The VIA Strengths Inventory (Peterson & Seligman, 2004) assesses 24 virtues,
including the MH. Evidence for the reliability of the MH has been reported in a variety
of samples. The MH lacks primary evidence of construct validity, though some evidence
is found in Rowatt et al.(2006). Items illustrate the ironic predicament that respondents
are placed in when they are asked to describe their own humility. For instance, how
would someone who is truly humble answer items such as ―I am proud that I am an
ordinary person,‖ or ―People are drawn to me because I am humble,‖ or ―I am always
humble about the good things that have happened to me‖? People who strongly endorse
such items might seem more narcissistic than humble. These items are certainly ironic:
does being ―proud‖ of being ordinary really constitute being humble? Does claiming that
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one is ―always humble‖ indicate humility? Furthermore, the remaining seven items refer
explicitly to modesty, which is a set of behaviors (in response to recognition or public
attention) that are often associated with humility but are not to be equated with humility:
―I do not like to stand out in a crowd,‖ ―I do not act as if I am a special person,‖ ―I never
brag about my accomplishments,‖ ―I prefer to let other people talk about themselves,‖ ―I
rarely call attention to myself,‖ ―I have been told that modesty is one of my most notable
characteristics,‖ ―No one would ever describe me as arrogant.‖
The 192 item HEXACO-PI (Lee & Ashton, 2004) was derived through factor
analysis. Previous lexical studies have typically extracted five personality factors (Costa
& McCrae, 1992). Lee and Ashton (2004) extracted a sixth factor—honesty-humility
(HH). The HH subscale (32 items) is most closely aligned with agreeableness from the
traditional five-factor model (i.e., agreeableness, neuroticism, openness, extraversion, and
conscientiousness).Scores on the HH have shown evidence of estimated reliability across
a variety of samples. Likewise, the HH subscale on the HEXACO-PI has been found
incrementally to predict constructs of low sociability (i.e., psychopathy, sexual restraint,
Machiavellianism, boredom proneness, and social adroitness) above and beyond the fivefactor model of personality (for a review, see Ashton & Lee, 2007). I found 29 studies
that addressed HH through mid-2009 (for a list of references, please contact the first
author).
My critique of the HH does not call into question the important contribution of the
HEXACO-PI to personality psychology. However, as a humility researcher, I do invite a
challenge to the name of the factor. As a measure of humility, items lack face-validity,
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for they primarily refer to negative evaluative qualities (or their negation; i.e., indicating
high scores on HH are unsly, uncunning, uncrafty, unfeigning, undevious, courtly,
heroic, unmercenary, unpretentious, polished, slick, and undeceptive; indicating low
scores on HH are affected, cunning, sugary, posed, unsophisticated, unwise, tricky,
sneaky, sly, suave, ungraceful, pretentious, unpretending, unlearned, foxy, uneducated,
and pompous).
In sum, the two self-report measures that I critiqued have items that do not align
well with how humility has been defined. Items from the MH primarily assessed
modesty, which researchers have differentiated from humility. Similarly, the HH
subscale of the HEXECO-PI appears to assess negative, antisocial qualities or their
opposites (formed by putting ―un‖ before the adjective). In addition to these problems,
research has yet to address the warning regarding the validity of self-reports of humility;
namely that self-reports of high levels of humility may ironically indicate a lack of
humility.
Social Comparisons of Self to Others
A second approach to measuring humility used an adapted self-enhancement
measure. Rowatt et al.(2002) defined humility as having an accurate appraisal of one’s
positive and negative characteristics. They had college students compare themselves to a
reference group (e.g., the average college student) on how well they obeyed 12
commandments from Christian Scriptures. In prior research, such social comparisons
have been used to measure self-enhancement in a sample. If everyone answers
accurately, the mean ranking across a sample should be 50th percentile. Thus if the mean
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rating is at the 70th percentile, this constitutes evidence of self-enhancement. However,
social comparisons have difficulty detecting self-enhancement for individuals, because
the measure confounds self-enhancement with actual differences (Kwan, John, Kenny,
Bond, & Robbins, 2004). For example, Rowatt et al. (2002) found that participants with
high intrinsic religiosity (e.g., defined as religiosity for its own sake, not for extrinsic
motivations) reported greater adherence to biblical commandments than did those with
less intrinsic religiosity. Rowatt et al. reported that highly intrinsically religious people
were less humble than those with less intrinsic religiosity. An alternative explanation is
that highly intrinsically religious people (in a highly Christian sample) accurately
perceived that they did obey Christian commandments more than people who were less
committed to Christianity or non-religious.
Since Rowatt et al. (2002) was published, important advancements have occurred
within the self-enhancement literature that might be used to study humility. Although she
studied self-enhancement per se and not humility, Kwan and her colleagues proposed a
componential approach to measured self-enhancement in individuals (Kwan et al., 2004).
Using a round-robin design, they have participants interact in a small group and then rate
themselves and others on several traits. Then they derive a self-enhancement score that
simultaneously accounted for how participants compare themselves to others (i.e., social
comparisons) and the discrepancy between self-ratings and informant-ratings (i.e., selfinsights). Granted, just because someone does not self-enhance does not necessarily
suggest that one is humble—e.g., one may be a clinically depressed narcissist. However,
Kwan’s use of round-robin design might eventually be employed in humility

12

measurement (e.g., humility researchers could use their method to study the modesty
effect that has been hypothesized by Tangney [2005] for self-reports of humility), but this
is not de rigueur for the present.
Implicit Association Test of Humility versus Arrogance
Rowatt and his colleagues have developed an implicit association test of humility
versus arrogance (IAT-HA; Rowatt et al., 2006; Powers et al., 2007). IATs have been
used to study constructs (i.e., traits and attitudes) that are prone to distortion by
impression management or social desirability (see, for example, Greenwald & Banaji,
1995). Rowatt et al. (2006) defined humility as a psychological quality characterized by
more humble, modest, down-to-earth, open-minded, and respectful of others (and less
arrogant, immodest, conceited, closed-minded, or egotistical).
The IAT test is given through a computer program in which words related to
humility or arrogance flash on a screen (e.g., humble, modest, tolerant, down-to-earth,
respectful, or open-minded; arrogant, immodest, egotistical, high-and-mighty, closedminded, or conceited). Participants pair the words with either self or other, as quickly as
possible, by pressing the corresponding letter on the keyboard (e.g., S = self; O = other).
Participants complete several rounds. The researcher alternates pairings between rounds
(i.e., either humble with self or humble with other). The rationale behind the method is
that the task can be performed more quickly if associations (e.g., self and humility) are
familiar or affectively congruent (as they would be for a person who internally perceived
himself or herself as humble), and less quickly if associations are unfamiliar or
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affectively incongruent (e.g., self and arrogant, for the person who perceives himself or
herself as humble). The authors presented the IAT-HA as a measure of trait humility.
One strength of the IAT-HA measure is its design. Given the history of
measurement problems, humility seems like a perfect fit for an implicit measure. At this
point, the IAT-HA is a clever and promising innovation in the measurement of humility.
The measure exhibited some evidence for estimated reliability. Estimated internal
consistency between trials ranged from .87 to .89 (Rowatt et al., 2006). However, the
two-week temporal stability estimates are lower than ideal (r = .44; scores at T1
accounted for 20% of the variance in scores two weeks later), given that Rowatt et al.
treat humility as a personality trait. Recent innovations in IAT technology have made it
quite portable: IATs have been placed on websites that can be accessed from any
computer with internet access, and paper-pencil versions have even been created (Lemm,
Lane, Sattler, Khan, & Nosek, 2008).
Despite the promise of the IAT-HA, some additional work is needed to firmly
establish evidence for its construct validity. Currently, it is not clear what the IAT-HA
actually measures. The scale did not correlate with previously developed measures of
modesty or humility or with informant reports of humility (Rowatt et al., 2006). The
measure was shown to predict academic grades—not a strong or obvious tie to humility.
Currently, there is little evidence that the measure predicts humble behavior (or even
behavior associated with low humility, such as immodesty; Tice, Butler, Muraven, &
Stillwell, 1995). Whereas other researchers have successfully developed IAT measures
that are supported by good validity evidence, the IAT-HA will, in the future, need to
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show that the measure is not actually assessing constructs that have been differentiated
from humility, such as arrogance, narcissism, or self-esteem (Tangney, 2005). For
instance, it is important to show that scores on the IAT-HA do not simply reflect
participants’ aversion to seeing themselves as arrogant. It is certainly a plausible
hypothesis that one could be averse to thinking of oneself as arrogant, yet not be humble
at all. Clearly, the IAT-HA is an innovative effort to measure humility, but more work is
needed to establish its strengths and weaknesses.
Informant Ratings of Humility
A fourth way researchers have measured humility is that they have asked
informants to rate a target person’s humility. In each case, the method has been used to
offer evidence of criterion validity for a measure being developed (e.g., Lee et al., 2009;
Rowatt et al., 2006). Self-report measures, such as the MH or the HH, were adapted to
assess an informant’s judgment of a target person’s humility (e.g., ―People are drawn to
him/her [instead of ―me‖] because he/she is [instead of ―I am‖] humble.‖
The findings using informant ratings have been inconsistent. Several studies
showed weak relationships between the primary measure of humility and informant
ratings. The IAT-HA was unrelated to informant ratings of humility on the adapted MH
(Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Teacher ratings of students were unrelated to student
ratings of themselves on the adolescent version of the MH (Park & Peterson, 2006).
Rowatt et al. (2006) found moderate correlations between self-reports and informantreports using the MH and adapted MH (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Informants’ ratings
of humility tended to be higher than did self-reports. This could be construed as evidence
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of the modesty effect for self-reports of humility. However, other studies on the selfother agreement of evaluative traits have also found that informant-reports were higher
than self-reports (e.g., Murray, Holmes, & Griffen, 1996). Furthermore, self-other
agreement of humility ratings for the HH was as high as .60 when informants were
romantic partners; however, ratings by casual acquaintances, co-workers, or friends were
substantially lower (r = .22, .28, and .30, respectively; de Vries et al., 2008).
An advantage of using informants is that the method bypasses what I have called
the modesty effect (see Figure 1), which researchers think undermines the inherent
validity of self-reports (e.g., Tangney, 2005). Namely, informants can rate another
person as humble without violating modesty norms. Although it is generally immodest
for an individual to claim to be humble, it would not be immodest to refer to someone
else as humble. Furthermore, social considerations when one rates someone else might
be minimized if one were relatively certain the attribution would not get back to the other
person.
The method has several limitations that relate to how it has been used in prior
research. First, existing measures of humility, when adapted to allow others to rate a
target’s humility, still have issues of face-validity that I observed in discussing selfreports. Furthermore, no existing measure has strong evidence of construct and criterion
validity in unadapted, much less adapted, format.
Second, using informants to rate someone’s humility can be a time intensive and
expensive method, requiring researchers to collect multiple informants for each
participant to achieve a valid assessment of trait humility. However, Vazire (2006)
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recently challenged some common misconceptions regarding the use of informants.
Critics have suggested that it is too labor intensive, yet researchers can use the internet to
gather informant ratings rather efficiently, and taking certain precautions, Vazire has
been able to achieve surprisingly high response rates (i.e., 76-95%).
Third, informants may report that a target person is more humble (or less humble)
than he or she actually is. How can researchers know whether informants are accurate?
And how should researchers handle discrepancies between ratings of different informants
or between self-ratings and informant ratings? For example, Watson and Humrichhouse
(2006) found that self-other agreement on the Big Five was initially high in newly
married couples, but over time, decreases in marital satisfaction caused self-other
agreement to diminish. Park, Krause, and Ryan (1997) found that agreement between
informants did not increase over time for college roommates; however, agreement was
highest for informants that liked the target person to a similar degree. Gill and Swann
(2004) found that fraternity members tended to agree with each other when they
predicted how a member would act within the group, but consensus between informants
was substantially less when they predicted how a member would act with his or her
family (the reverse pattern was found when target persons were rated by family
members). Therefore it is not clear how researchers should interpret informant ratings.
Fourth, because the method has been used reflexively as an indicator of criterionrelated validity for other primary measures of humility, the method has received little
theoretical attention as a method of measuring humility in its own right. Nor has the
method been elaborated by humility researchers.
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These limitations are substantial. However, a rich theoretical and empirical
literature in both social and personality psychology has accumulated on the nature of
personality judgments (for reviews, see Funder, 1995; Kenny, 2004; Kwan et al., 2004;
McCrae &Weiss, 2007). Given our point regarding the lack of theoretical elaboration on
the method, I will propose a model of relational humility that actually defines humility as
a personality judgment. I argue that treating humility as a personality judgment leads to a
number of hypotheses that can be studied empirically.
A Model of Relational Humility
We propose a theoretical shift: instead of focusing on the humility of an
individual, researchers can treat humility as a subjective personality judgment.
Accordingly, I define relational humility as a relationship-specific judgment in which an
observer attributes to a target person five qualities: (a) positive other-orientedness in the
target’s relationships with others; (b) the ability for the target to regulate his or her selforiented emotions, such as pride or excitement about one’s accomplishments; (c) a
tendency to inhibit socially off-putting expressions of those emotions; (d) a tendency to
express positive, other-oriented emotions in one’s relationships (e.g., empathy,
compassion, sympathy, and love); and (e) an ability to down-regulate emotions that
promote self-focus, such as guilt, shame, sadness, or excessive pride that may impair his
or her relationship with others.
Based on this definition, judgments of humility are relationship-specific: they
reflect a particular person’s perception of his or her cumulative experiences with a target
person. Furthermore, I expect that judgments of relational humility will increase
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collaboration and trust and decrease conflict in a relationship. Individuals should be
expected to feel safe initiating or deepening a relationship with someone they judge to be
humble.
Measuring Relational Humility
Our definition of humility suggests a straightforward measurement strategy. First,
relational humility is measured by having an observer who is in an actual relationship
with a target person rate that person’s humility. (For example, researchers might adapt
items of the MH. Given its problems with face-validity, however, I suggest that
researchers initiate new scale development efforts—especially those informed by
definitions like the one above.) This relationship-specific judgment—with the various
distortions that may occur based on the observer’s relationship with the target person—is
the construct of interest. Below, I will consider how researchers might begin to
empirically investigate the various relational moderators I expect will influence humility
judgments.
Trait humility is conceptualized as the inter-judge agreement of humility
judgments across a target person’s relationships (Kenny, 1994). Note that this is not to
be confused with inter-rater reliability. Reliability involves a common stimulus (such as
a videotape) that is rated by different judges. However, the relationship between one
informant and target is different from the relationship between another informant and the
same target. Namely, they have different experiences than each other with the target.
Hence, the correlation or computation of probability-adjusted inter-rater reliability (such
as when using Cohen’s kappa) is not necessarily expected to be exceptionally high. In
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fact, agreement between two informants’ ratings, even those who know a target well, tend
to be rather low (r < .20), but ratings between aggregates of, for instance, four raters’
ratings tend to be much higher (Kenny, 2004). By aggregating a variety of judgments,
one can smooth out idiosyncrasies in particular relationships and discern a reliable picture
of the judgment of the trait of humility. Furthermore, prior research on personality
judgments highlights some of the relationship factors that can artificially inflate
agreement between informants, such as when informants are sampled from only people
who tend to agree in how much they like the target person (i.e., friends; Kurtz & Sherker,
2003). According to Kenny (2004), the benefits of acquaintance occur rather early in a
relationship—after about 100 observations of behavior. After that limited observation—
which occurs surprisingly quickly—additional benefit in rating agreement does not occur.
Application of a Realistic Accuracy Model to Relational Humility
A relational definition of humility has a number of implications for the study of
humility. To provide a theoretical template to begin thinking about these implications, I
apply Funder’s (1995) realistic accuracy model (RAM) of personality judgments to the
judgment of humility. Thus, I hypothesize that four steps must occur for an observer to
accurately judge humility.
First, in some relationship context, the target must express behavior that is
relevant to the trait of humility. For instance, based on our definition, I expect that
immodest or arrogant behaviors will tend to promote low judgments of humility. In
addition, for an observer to perceive high humility, he or she must interpret a target’s
behavior as other-oriented; that is, as serving the interests of others more than or as much
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as the target’s own interest. Such complex attributions occur as the observer intuits a
target person’s internal motivations from his or her cumulative experience with the
person.
Second, the judge must observe the behavior. This step emphasizes that an
informant judges relational humility from his or her actual experiences with the target
person. Some people will have access to more and different varieties of experiences than
will others. For example, romantic partners observe each other across a range of
relationships and situations. They may give each other access to many of their inner
thoughts. They may know how the other person handles negative situations, such as
conflict; or positive situations, such as receiving praise. On the other hand, romantic
partners are not omniscient observers. A male spouse might not share with his mate how
he deals with praise from his adult soccer-teammates, or how he handles successes at
work, or even the private praise his children communicate to him.
Third, the judge must detect the behavior. At this step, too, the judge is prone to
err. Detection may be influenced by the judge’s conscious and uncionscious motivations.
In addition, some observers may be more capable of detecting cues of humility than
others are.
Fourth, the judge must correctly utilize the detected behavior (and not misuse
irrelevant behavior). Accordingly, the informant’s relationship with the target person
may affect how he or she tends to interpret information. For example, informants may
discount arrogant or immodest behavior of friends, especially if it is rare. Alternatively,
an observer with a competitive relationship with a target person might be highly
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motivated to pick up on even hints of arrogant behaviors, but he or she might be less
likely to perceive humble behaviors.
Based on these four steps, I hypothesize that there are four moderators (following
Funder, 1995) that affect whether humility is judged accurately: a good judge, a good
target, a good trait, and good information. A good judge: some informants will be more
attuned to perceiving humility. For example, some informants are better than are others
at intuiting the emotions and intentions of others. Likewise, some informants’ ratings
will be less influenced by defensiveness or other information processing biases. A good
target: targets who are generally authentic and consistently humble across relationships
should be easier to judge as humble than are targets who self-monitor frequently and
spend considerable effort managing the impressions they make on others. A good trait:
humility judgments may be easier to make in the negative (e.g., that the person is nonother-oriented, immodest, arrogant, not prone to express positive other-oriented
emotions, or not able to regulate self-focused emotions), drawing on only a few examples
of very low humility. As Baumeister, Bratslavsky, and Finkenauer (2001) observed, the
bad is stronger than the good. People are predisposed by evolutionary history to attend to
negative behavior more than positive. To fail to attend to potentially harmful behavior in
the other puts one at a survival disadvantage. However, attributions of high humility
refer to subtle judgments of a target person’s motivations in relationships. Furthermore,
humility is an evaluative trait, and evaluative traits tend to be more difficult than nonevaluative traits to judge accurately (John & Robbins, 1993). Good information:
observers who know a target well are most likely to have access to information relevant
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to humility. Knowing a person well does not just include the longevity of the
relationship, but also the extent to which an informant has been able to observe the target
across a variety of relationships and roles. In addition, informants who are more intimate
with a target person are more likely to gain access and appropriately interpret the target
person’s inner thoughts and feelings—at least those the target shares.
Next Steps Based on a Relational Model of Humility
Based on this model of relational humility—with its definition, methodology
(formed around personality judgments within particular relationships), and related
hypotheses—I have several recommendations for researchers. First, I suggest that
researchers clarify their definitions of humility, as I have attempted to do. Importantly,
definitions must include positive behaviors indicating humility, not just the absence of
negative behaviors indicating lack of humility (e.g., arrogance, self-enhancement, and so
forth).
Second, given the problems with face-validity of the MH (Peterson & Seligman,
2004) and the HH (Lee & Ashton, 2004), I recommend that researchers develop simple,
face-valid measures of humility judgments that align with the researchers’ definition of
humility. If definitions are cast in behavioral terms, they will lead towards clear
hypotheses regarding humility judgments that can be empirically falsified (e.g., my
definition predicts that informants will judge a person as exhibiting humility when they
perceive positive other-orientedness in the target’s relationships with others, evidence of
attempted regulation of the target’s self-oriented emotions, evidence of inhibition of
socially off-putting expressions of those emotions; expression of positive-other oriented
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emotions in the target’s relationships, and efforts to down-regulate emotions that indicate
self-preoccupation). In my model, relational humility consists of an informant’s ratings
of a target person’s humility. Likewise, trait humility is estimated with the consensus of
ratings among observers.
Third, researchers might explore the relational moderators of humility
judgments—such as characteristics of the judge, the target person, and the information
available to the judge (Funder, 1995). For example, researchers can explore the qualities
that are hypothesized to be associated with high judgments of humility (e.g., presence of
other-oriented emotions, absence of self-conscious emotions, agreeableness, gratitude in
a relationship, etc.). In addition, researchers can explore the various behaviors that are
relevant to humility (e.g., moderating attention when receiving praise or disarming
conflict through effective empathy during conflict). Likewise, observers may rely on
categorically different cues when judging humility in friends than they do strangers
(McAdams & Pals, 2006). Previous theory and research on personality judgments
provides a furtile ground for initial hypotheses.
Fourth, researchers might explore culturally contextualized humility. An aspect
of my definition is that humble people express self-conscious emotions in ways that are
socially acceptable. It would be interesting to explore how gender norms, cultural status,
or power hierarchies affect humility appraisals. Furthermore, researchers could
investigate how a person’s relationship with the Sacred (i.e., God, a transcendent cause, a
deeply shared value, etc.) affects humility appraisals. I expect that people will be more
likely to appraise humility in a person when rating someone they perceive as spiritually
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similar (e.g., two people share a commitment to a similar understanding of the Sacred or
to a similar spiritual community).
Fifth, as definitional disputes begin to be resolved and the literature on humility
judgments expands, researchers can revisit other measurement strategies. For example,
once more is known about when people attribute high humility to someone, researchers
can investigate whether the IAT-HA, self-reports, or self-enhancement methods can
accurately predict such criterion-related variables. Likewise, once measures of humility
are established, researchers might use Kwan et al.’s (2004) componential approach to
study self-enhancement methods of assessing of humility. The means are now available
to test empirically the widely held assumption that humble people are likely to modestly
report their own humility.
Conclusion
Virtue is becoming an important focus of study in psychological research;
however, research on the study of humility has not kept pace with research on many other
virtues. I believe that the lack of progress is because humility has been difficult to define
and measure. In the present review, I critiqued the existing self-report measures of
humility, as well as other measures that have tried to assess this construct. Then I
proposed a theoretical model of relational humility that conceptualizes humility as
personality judgment that occurs within a specific relationship. The model calls for
straight-forward measurement of humility judgments. In addition, trait humility can be
estimated by examining the consensus of ratings among raters of a target person. Once
theoretically consistent measures are developed, the approach can be used to explore how
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humility appraisals are affected by individual characteristics, situations, and cultures. As
knowledge about humility judgments accumulates, researchers can apply this knowledge
to examine evidence for other measurement strategies, such as the IAT-HA or selfreports, and to gain a better understanding of how humility is important to trusting,
respectful, and collaborative relationships.
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Chapter 3: A Story of Two Sisters—Modesty, Courted by Many Lovers and
Humility, the Ugly Half Sister
Early in life, I had to choose between honest arrogance or hypocritical humility. I chose
the former and have seen no reason to change.
--Frank Lloyd Wright
The study of modesty and humility—two traits that many consider closely
entwined (e.g., Gregg, Hart, Sedikides, & Kumashiro, 2008)—have had radically
different growth trajectories. The scientific study of modesty has fared well, according to
a recent review (Sedikedes, Gregg, & Hart, 2006), which surveyed an expansive body of
research on modesty, self-enhancement, impression management, and narcissism. I
conducted a Psych Info search on these respective literatures on March 5th, 2010 and
found 136 on empirical studies on modesty; 445, on self-enhancement; 908, on
impression management; and 754, on narcissism. In contrast, humility has not fared as
well scientifically. I found fewer than 20 empirical studies on humility (excluding
studies of the HEXACO, which includes a modesty subscale). Why has research on
modesty fared so well, whereas research on humility has not?
In the first part of this dissertation, I suggest one possible answer to this question.
In the second part of the dissertation, in order to bring the study of humility and modesty
into greater alignment, I present a theory of relational humility, which conceptualizes it
as a personality judgment. Personality judgments straddle the fence between social
psychology and personality psychology. They are judgments of someone’s personality
made by another in social context. Our theoretical model consists of five propositions:
27

(a) humility is attributed in relationships; (b) humility strengthens social bonds; (c)
people rely on three sources of information to judge humility; (d) humility is best judged
in situations that make humility difficult to practice; and (e) humility information is
communicated both verbally and non-verbally.
Why the Study of Modesty Has Fared Better than the Study of Humility
The study of modesty has flourished more than the study of humility because it
has proved easier to define and measure. Definitions of modesty have focused on one of
two types of modesty: interpersonal modesty and intrapersonal modesty. These two
types of modesty have been studied in somewhat independently developing literatures.
Definitions of interpersonal modesty have focused on behavior: the degree to which a
person acts in ways that moderate recognition or attention, such as expressing gratitude or
embarrassment to regulate envy in others (Gregg et al., 2008). Definitions of
intrapersonal modesty have focused on beliefs toward self and others: the degree to
which a person has an accurate view of his or her strengths and abilities (Gregg et al.,
2008).
These two kinds of modesty may or may not coexist. For example, a person can
behave modesty for entirely selfish reasons. An arrogant person might display modesty
in public situations as a default strategy for easing envy. Furthermore, just because
people have modest beliefs about themselves or accurate evaluative self-appraisals does
not mean they will behave modestly. For example, Muhammud Ali probably was the
greatest boxer alive when he claimed to be ―the greatest.‖ Although his claim was likely
accurate, not many considered it to be modest.
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Conversely, humility has been harder to define and measure. Definitions of
humility have called for integrity between behavior (e.g., interpersonal modesty), thought
(e.g., moderate view of self), and motivation (e.g., other-orientedness rather than selfish;
see Davis, Worthington, & Hook, in press, for a review of definitions of humility). For
example, Tangney (2009) defined humility as involving the simultaneous presence of five
qualities: (a) having an accurate view of self; (b) being able to acknowledge one’s
limitations and mistakes; (c) being open to different ideas and keeping perspective of
one’s accomplishments; (d) having a low self-focus; and (e) having an appreciation of
and value for all things, especially other people.
Such multi-faceted definitions of humility have made it difficult for researchers to
agree on a good way of measuring humility, whereas definitions of modesty have led to
reasonably accepted measurement strategies for it. Studies on interpersonal modesty
have generally employed experiments that manipulate behavioral expressions of modesty,
such having participants describe their strengths to different audiences (Tice et al., 1995;
Baumeister & Ilko, 1995). Also, most broad-band personality instruments include a
modesty subscale (e.g., NEO, Costa & McCrae, 1992; HEXACO, Lee & Ashton, 2004;
VIA-SI, Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Studies on intrapersonal modesty have generally
assessed self-enhancement (i.e., the degree to which a person has an overly positive view
of self), including measures of how individuals compare themselves to other people, or
measures that compare self-reports to other-reports.
In contrast, humility researchers have not yet found a well-accepted way of
assessing humility (perhaps unsurprising given the complex, multi-faceted definitions
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that have been put forth). Humility researchers have been especially preoccupied with a
paradox of measuring humility using self-reports (although this paradox strangely has not
bothered modesty researchers). Namely, claiming to be humble seems like blatant selfpromotion and aggrandizement. As the argument goes, truly humble individuals should
be less likely to make such an audacious claim than arrogant individuals. Thus, to the
degree that one is truly humble, one should modestly self-report one’s humility. This
modesty effect on self-reports has not been empirically demonstrated, but should it exist,
it would pose a problem. It is conceivable that three people with vastly different degrees
of humility—high, medium, and low—might give similar estimates of their humility.
Someone who is narcissistic would self-enhance a great deal; one moderate in humility
would self-enhance some; and one high in humility would not self-enhance at all and may
underestimate their humility.
Taking the existence of this problem for granted, humility researchers have been
on a quest for an acceptable measurement solution, looking for a strategy to bypass the
apparent paradox of self-reporting one’s own humility. Researchers have explored
various alternatives, such as self-enhancement measures, implicit measures, or otherreports (for a review, see Davis et al., in press). However, the study of humility has
remained in a preliminary stage of disputing definitions and looking for acceptable
measures. For example, blaming intractable measurement issues for the lack of research
on humility, Tangney (2009) recently wrote of humility, ―If you can’t measure it, you
can’t study it‖(p. 483).
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I note in passing that actually, one can study humility without measuring it if one
is willing to accept the veracity of manipulating states of humility. This would require
one to limit attention to humility states rather than traits, and it would make it difficult to
employ an agreed-upon manipulation check for the state of humility that presumably is
induced. The manipulation check would reduce to either accepting the face validity of
the manipulation, relying on an other-judgment of humility, or employing a self-report
that one felt humble.
Toward Integrating the Study of Modesty and Humility: A Theory of Relational
Humility
Therefore, I argue that the core problem is not a measurement issue per se. Social
psychologists have successfully studied a number of constructs that are not amenable to
self-reports (i.e., constructs associated with the unconscious, sense of fragile or stable
self-esteem, etc.) through experimental methods. Indeed, I believe many experimental
studies on modesty or narcissism have experimentally manipulated behavioral
expressions of humility, as I describe below. What is actually lacking, then, is a theory of
humility that defines the construct, discusses how it is similar and different from other
constructs, describes why it is important to study, and systematically lays out predictions
of how humility should affect other constructs. Namely, I argue that various strategies of
measuring humility cannot be evaluated until researchers define humility and clarify the
behavioral expressions of humility.
To address the need for a theory of humility, I elaborate on a model described by
Davis et al. (in press), who proposed a model of relational humility. This model of
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relational humility conceptualized humility as a personality judgment. It thus aligned the
study of humility with a large literature on personality judgments of other evaluative
traits, including well-developed methods for examining the overlap between self-report,
other-report, and behavioral expressions of a trait (e.g., Funder, 1995; Vazire, 2010). The
theoretical model by Davis et al. consists of five propositions.
Proposition 1: Relational Humility Is Attributed within Relationships
The first proposition is that humility is attributed within relationships. Relational
humility is defined as the degree to which one person attributes the following three
qualities to a target person: (a) regulation of egotism (and self-oriented emotions) in
socially acceptable ways; (b) accurate or moderate evaluative view of self; and (c) otheroriented, marked by a respect and value for others. Thus, humility involves integrity
between behavior, thought, and motivation. Attributions of humility help people predict
how they are likely to be treated in a relationship.
Regulation of egoistic motives. People are motivated to think well of
themselves, which is gratifying to the individual. Egotism, however, can be
interpersonally disruptive when it exacerbates competition for limited resources. Thus,
egotism is beneficial for the individual (because it increases self-esteem), but may be
damaging for dyadic or group relationships (because it increases conflict). Blatantly
egoistic behaviors may eventually decrease self-esteem due to reduced social acceptance
(see Leary, Tabor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995, who have theorized that self-esteem monitors
the reactions of others and alerts the individual to the possibility of social exclusion). By
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accepting humble behaviors and disapproving of egoistic behaviors, individuals and
groups can restrain egoistic behaviors and promote humility.
Although individuals generally seek an equilibrium that balances the wishes of
the self and others, certain situations can antagonize a person’s egoistic motivations (e.g.,
threats to self-esteem). Namely, ego threats can evoke self-focused emotions (e.g.,
shame, pride) that encourage individuals to act selfishly, which may put them at risk for
hurting their relationships and reputation with others. To decrease tension in
relationships, individuals can regulate their expression of such self-focused emotions.
For example, a person who has been publically shamed might down regulate his or her
self-focused shame and express this emotion using strategies (e.g., avoidance, direct
confrontation) that are preferred within the group. Or a person receiving public
recognition might regulate internal pride by expressing gratitude in a way that
successfully decreases envy and jealousy in others (Exline & Lobel, 1997; Exline, Single,
Lobel, & Geyer, 2004). Again, the person must effectively read the cultural context.
Expressing gratitude may be a generally effective strategy, but only if others do not view
the behavior as manipulative and self-promoting.
Moderate evaluative view of self. Individuals use behavioral expressions of
humility to infer a person’s state of mind, including attitudes about self and others.
Humility involves having a moderate evaluative view of self—not too high or too low.
(Note, that this is not a view of the self in terms of self-description; rather, it is a view of
one’s socially desirable characteristics. It is necessarily evaluative, and it evaluates
oneself accurately—at least in the view of the person who might make a personality
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judgment.) Having an arrogant view of self generally leads one to feel entitled to
overprescribed resources and to regard one’s own needs more than those of others.
However, having an overly negative view of self causes negative emotions that impede
one’s performance and ability to contribute to the relationship or group. For example,
consider several co-authors working on a psychology manuscript together. Having an
inflated view of one’s skills will lead to tension and power struggle, but having a deflated
view of one’s skills may cause co-authors to feel frustrated that one has not fairly
contributed to the project. Traditionally, researchers have assessed this quality by
comparing someone’s view of self to some criterion, such as how they view others (i.e.,
social comparisons) or are viewed by others (i.e., self-insights). In the present model,
however, I assess the construct subjectively. Namely, people judge a target person’s
attitudes towards self by observing their behavior, such as talkativeness, tone of voice,
posture, or expressed beliefs as it is assumed to reflect on socially desirable attributes.
The question of whether accurate, self-depleting, or self-enhancing views of self best
predict behavioral expressions of humility is an empirical one.
Other-orientedness. Most individuals are able to act humbly with enough social
pressure. The quality of other-orientedness is the glue that brings integrity to the other
qualities. Namely, judgments of humility assess the extent to which a person tends to act
in the interests of others across situations and relationships. If the person does not,
modest behaviors may be viewed as manipulative or contingent on a particular social
condition. More than just regulating egoistic behaviors, humility involves practicing
other-oriented behavior, especially sacrificial behaviors. Sacrifice involves doing
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something personally costly that benefits another individual. Sacrifices communicate
commitment within a relationship.
Self-sacrifice and other-orientedness is not desirably in all cases. Groups
generally value members who are willing to share resources and sacrifice for the needs of
other in-group members. On the other hand, if a person is seen to value those in an outgroup, he or she will likely not be perceived as humble but rather will likely be perceived
with some mixture of having betrayed the in group, being foolish, or being a ―sucker.‖
Proposition 2: Humility Strengthens Social Bonds
The second proposition is that relational humility strengthens social bonds. To
describe how individuals might come to act in other-oriented ways, I draw on Selective
Investment Theory (Brown & Brown, 2006). The theory examined the problem of costly
long-term investment (CLI), which has perplexed evolutionary psychologists studying
altruism. Although other theories can explain some altruistic behaviors (e.g., reciprocity;
kin-altruism), they have had difficulty explaining long-term sacrifices in a relationship
that appear to hurt the person’s evolutionary fitness (i.e., ability to reproduce more
effectively than one’s rivals). An example is an adult who takes care of an aging parent
for many years. Care-taking depletes resources (e.g., psychological, physical, financial)
that would be more fruitfully directed towards the adult’s own children. Other theories
especially have trouble explaining the proximal mechanisms that regulate costly longterm investment.
According to Selective Investment Theory, social bonds regulate costly-long term
investment. Social bonds are dynamic, emotionally loaded memory structures that
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produce an affinity for another person or group. Social bonds motivate a person to look
after another person’s well-being, even when the behavior is costly and may not be
reciprocated (i.e., sacrifice behaviors). Namely, at the biological level (i.e., through
neurohormonal events such as the release of oxytocin), social bonds make a person more
likely to experience emotions that cause one to attend to the needs of others (e.g.,
empathy, sympathy, guilt) rather than to emotions that cause one to attend to one’s own
needs. For example, in terms of moment-by-moment regulation of behavior, why would
one faced with a predator ever put oneself in harm’s way for a friend as opposed to
running? According to Selective Investment Theory, having a strong social bond causes
the person to react to the threat as if it were a threat to self, even at the biological and
physiological level.
If social bonds cause people to act not just in their own interests, but also in the
interests of others with whom they are bonded, then the threat would be someone who
would exploit this arrangement. Thus, individuals must effective regulate their social
bonds. Brown and Brown (2006) argued that interdependency, valuing a relationship as
essential to meeting one’s basic psychological or physical needs, is a core ingredient that
allows social bonds to strengthen. Additionally, I posit that attributions of humility may
regulate and strengthen social bonds.
To support this claim, I draw on recent theorizing on how emotions influence
behavior (Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang,2007). Conscious emotions generally
occur somewhat slowly (i.e., a few minutes after an event), and cause a person to think
about what just happened, in order to learn from the experience. After an interpersonal
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hurt, a person may ruminate angrily about the offense, viewing the offender as less
humble and more egotistical. After observing a sacrifice, the recipient may feel gratitude
or relief, leading the person to view the target person as more humble. Generally,
negative emotions cause individuals to ruminate on the details of an unwanted event, as
though to prevent it in the future, whereas positive emotions cause individuals to place a
general stamp of approval on what just happened (i.e., it was most likely not one thing
that led to valued outcome, but the sum of the parts), allowing them to turn their focus to
the future. Viewing someone as less humble may cause one to change strategies of
engaging with the person (e.g., becoming more defensive and self-protective). In valued
relationships, one may communicate social feedback to the person, which if ignored may
result in further adjustment in one’s view of that person’s humility. If deterioration
continues, the bond may weaken until both persons are acting primarily in their own
interests.
Consider the following examples consistent with this theorizing. Humility is
likely important for social bonds in close, intimate relationships such as marriages. Most
likely, the positivity ratio (Gottman & Levenson, 1992; 5:1 ratio of positive to negative
interactions tend to have viable relationships, but those that do not meet this ratio tend to
divorce) indirectly causes gradual deterioration in a couple’s social bond. Negative
interactions lead couples to view their partner in globally negative ways (including
attributions of low humility), which results in a downward cycle of negative interactions,
negative emotions, and negative attributions in the marriage. At the group level, humility
should promote cohesion. Strong social bonds allow group members to devote
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themselves to the group in exchange for a sense of self-esteem, purpose, and identity
within the group. Accordingly, humility can enhance a leader’s ability to provide vision,
shared goals, and clear roles that cultivate group cohesion. For example, group leaders
may model humility by devoting themselves to the team, sacrificing for the group,
casting a vision that inspires group members to feel a sense of purpose, preserving justice
and fairness, and not letting individual agendas threaten group cohesion.
Proposition 3: Three Sources of Information that Help People Judge Humility
Individuals rely on three sources of information to judge humility and determine
whether they are likely to be treated with respect and value in a relationship (Baumeister
et al., 2007; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). First, individuals assess their own
emotions towards the person. Positive emotions (e.g., love, compassion, empathy) signal
the presence of a strong social bond, whereas negative emotions signal threat of
exploitation. Second, individuals consider their past experience with the person. For
example, past egregious transgressions followed by stubborn and selfish behavior should
be associated with attributions of low humility, whereas past behaviors that communicate
value and respect, such as sacrifices for the relationship, should be associated with high
attributions of humility. Third, individuals may appraise the target person’s current
behavior and emotions. Emotions signal a person’s current state of mind, including what
they are likely to do in the near future (Baumeister et al., 2007; Johnson & Fredrickson,
2005; Tangney et al., 2007). For example, negative emotions such as fear or shame
suggest increased threat of aggressive or avoidance behaviors. Contempt or disgust are
signs of deterioration in a relationship (Tangney et al., 2007). Conversely, positive,
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other-oriented emotions should generally signal humility in a relationship. Positive
emotions (e.g., joy, interest, gratitude) have been shown to broaden a person’s social
categories of self and other and eliminate within-race bias (Johnson & Fredrickson,
2005). Thus, they should signal that a person is ready to form or strengthen a
relationship.
Proposition 4: Humility Is Best Judged in Situations that Make it Difficult to
Practice Humility
The fourth proposition is that humility is best observed in situations that
antagonize egotism, making it harder for people to practice humility. A person cannot
judge humility accurately without observing behaviors relevant to the trait (Funder,
1995). In this way, humility is analogous to the virtue of courage. Courage, which has
been defined as the degree to which a person exercises moral strength to act heroically in
the midst of a dangerous circumstance (Shelp, 1984), cannot accurately be assessed in the
absence of danger. Similarly, humility is difficult to assess in situations that do have the
potential for egotism. I propose that humility is best judged in the following three
situations: (a) engaging in conflict; (b) receiving recognition or honor; and (c)
experiencing enhanced attention to hierarchical roles (i.e., positional authority) due to
being involved in power struggle. To the degree that people can act in other-oriented
ways, regulate egotism, and maintain a moderate view of self in these situations, they
should be attributed with high humility.
The first situation that strains a person’s ability to act humbly is conflict. Conflict
often leads to a variety of negative emotions (e.g., shame, contempt, disgust,
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unforgiveness) that cause individuals to devalue each other, viewing themselves as
morally superior to each other, and thus deteriorating the relationship. When a target
person has offended someone, humility allows the person to moderate one’s shame and
defensiveness, cultivate empathy for the victim’s perspective, and perhaps offer a sincere
effective apology. Furthermore, when a target person has been offended, humility helps
one regulate shame, anger and contempt, and cultivate empathy and other positive-other
oriented emotions towards the offender.
The second situation that strains a person’s ability to act humbly is receiving
recognition or praise. Humility involves handling the spotlight well. When someone
receives honor publicly, it disrupts the status hierarchy, which may provoke greater
competition and jealousy within a group. Even group members with a positive
relationship with the honoree may fear that the recognition will negatively affect their
relationship with the person. For example, if one member of a team receives a
promotion, other members may fear that the new status difference will hurt their
relationship with that person. Humility helps people effectively sense and respond to the
anxiety, fear, or envy of others. Humble people effectively choose from a variety of
strategies that best align with the modesty norms for the particular situation. For
example, they might express gratitude or embarrassment, or make self-deprecating jokes.
Gratitude, authentically expressed, shows that a person recognizes as the honor as
valuable, costly, and gratuitous (McCullough, Kilpatrick, Emmons, & Larson, 2001).
Gratitude evokes enjoyment in both the giver and receiver, strengthening the social bond
between them.
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The third situation that strains humility is dealing with power struggle in a
hierarchical relationship. Many social roles are hierarchical in nature (e.g., children and
parents, managers and employees, teachers and students). Norms of a group govern how
individuals are expected to act in higher or lower status roles. For example, teachers are
expected to prepare and become experts, express their thoughts clearly, give grades
fairly, and so forth; whereas students are expected to work hard, listen, do their best, and
respect and value the teacher’s expertise. Managers are expected to provide opportunities
and training, handle mediation of conflict fairly, devote themselves to the success of the
team, and so forth, whereas employees have their own set of expectations. Although
leaders have been endowed with status and power, they are expected to act in the interest
of those they serve. Groups may passively or even actively rebel when the leader fails to
act in the best interests of the group. Whether in a position of higher or lower status, the
humble person handles the power struggle in a way that decreases conflict in the group.
For example, a humble leader may resist the urge to put lower status individual in their
place, sacrificing some power to treat people with respect and value. For example,
Mother Teresa did not claim the rights of a higher social class, but rather she excluded
herself from the benefits of her role. A humble person in a position of lower status might
express dissent respectfully, and refuse to employ strategies to seize power illegitimately
(e.g., passive-aggressiveness), which undermine group cohesion.
Proposition 5: Humility Information Is Communicated Verbally and Non-verbally
The fifth proposition is that humility information is communicated both verbally
and non-verbally. In addition to using information from their own experience with the
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target person, individuals also judge humility using information they glean from hearing
stories or observing non-verbal reactions of other people to the target person. They thus
draw on information from the entire social environ to arrive at a personality judgment—
or even a situational judgment (i.e., ―She’s humble in this situation, although I know that
generally she’s pretty conceited‖). Humility reputations are valuable, because they afford
a person opportunities to forge and deepen social bonds in the future. Namely, people
should generally want to strengthen relationships with people who act humbly, even in
situations that make humility more difficult.
Consider the following example. A psychology department is considering Jeff for
a faculty position. His credentials are excellent. His letters of recommendation are
pristine. Furthermore, on his interview, Jeff was respectful, polite, and a delight to talk
to. However, before making a final decision, the committee contacts Jeff’s references, as
well as other people who have worked with him. As expected, Jeff’s research mentor
spoke highly of him. However, other faculty members describe him as aloof and out for
himself, giving several specific examples of how he was inconsiderate of others (e.g., not
volunteering for his share of service roles within the program).
I hypothesize that humility reputations are more quickly lost than formed. One
highly visible, selfish behavior may soil a person’s humility reputation indefinitely. The
transience of humility is an important social motivator. Given the value of a humble
reputation, people can generally assume that a person will be motivated to conserve a
good reputation by continuing to act humbly.
Implications for Future Research
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The proposed model has at least four important implications for the study of
humility and modesty. First, researchers should seek greater consensus in their
definitions of humility. To that end, I have suggested that humility is a broad construct
that involves integrity between behavior, thought, and motivation. One might act
modestly for selfish reasons, and one might have an accurate view of self without acting
interpersonally modest, but humility involves being other-oriented in one’s motivations.
That is, modest behavior can be enacted for any number of selfish reasons; however,
behavior is not typically considered humble if the motivations behind the behavior are
thought to be self-aggrandizing or self-promoting. Interpersonal modesty involves
regulating self-oriented emotions (e.g., pride) and one’s expression of such emotions in
order to moderate envy and jealousy in others. A person may choose many strategies to
express modesty, but one’s success depends on how one’s behavior is interpreted by
observers, which in turn depends on the social norms, history of personal interactions
with the person, and other aspects of the social situation. Because modesty behaviors
occur within a cultural and relational context, the same behavior might appear modesty to
one and extremely arrogant to another.
Second, our theory clarifies some of the measurement issues that have plagued the
field of humility. I conclude that the two types of modesty (i.e., intrapersonal and
interpersonal) have been reasonably measured. The constructs, however, do not
necessarily overlap. A person with an accurate evaluative view of self might fail to act
modestly. A person who generally acts modestly may have an arrogant view of self
paired with strong motivation to be accepted and admired by others. Thus, the person
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may have learned to conform to modesty norms without actually being other-oriented or
having an accurate view of self.
Humility involves integrity between action, belief, and motivation. Although it
may be difficult to measure whether this actually exists objectively, I believe that I can
examine whether people attribute humility within their relationships. To assess humility,
especially the elusive construct of being other-oriented, I suggest that researchers employ
a multi-method approach that includes self- and other-reports.
Third, I implore researchers to return to the roots of social and personality
psychology and study humble behaviors within the context of real relationship situations.
To move forward, researchers must use multi-modal measurement strategies and examine
how the various methods relate to each other. Namely, researchers should experimentally
manipulate situations that make humility difficult to practice (i.e., conflict, recognition,
power struggle), thus enhancing differences in humble behavior. At the same time,
researchers should examine how differences in behavior are related to attributions of
humility, both by participants within the study and by trained observers. Only by
triangulating behavior, social perception, and self-perception can I deal with the
complexity involved in the measurement of humility. Thankfully, for such a task, social
psychology has a rich resource of paradigms that can be used to influence behavioral
expressions of humility.
Fourth, armed with innovations in theory and measurement, researcher should
begin testing the various hypotheses implied by the model. For example, are otherreports better at predicting behavioral expressions of humility than self-reports? When?
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When are they not as good? Do humility attributions indeed strengthen social bonds
(e.g., commitment, relationship satisfaction, intimacy). Supporting this proposition will
help catalyze research on humility, lending evidence that humility plays an essential role
in the formation and maintenance of relationships (e.g., romantic, teams, leadersubordinate, etc.).
Conclusion
For years, the study of humility has been stagnant, presumably due to
measurement issues. I argued, however, that the greater need is for a more cohesive
theory of humility. Indeed, a number of paradigms within social psychology manipulate
humility-relevant behaviors; however, a theory of humility is needed in order to clarify
definitions and measurement strategies. To that end, I developed a theory of relational
humility that calls for the triangulation of self-report, other-report, and manipulation of
behavioral expressions of humility. The proposed solution to studying humility is not a
simple one, but the proposed model does translate some of the issues that have held-up
the study of humility into questions that can be empirically tested.
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Chapter 4: Development of the Relational Humility Scale and Investigation of
Theoretical Model
In the current chapter, I present four studies that describe the development of the
Relational Humility Scale (RHS) and investigate initial evidence for the proposed
theoretical model of relational humility. I first offer a general statement of the problem,
and then I describe the method, hypotheses, results, and discussion of each study.
General Statement of the Problem
As I discussed in Chapter 2, there are two reasons for the slow growth in research
on humility. First, researchers have developed no consensus on how to define or measure
humility, and many have been unwilling to measure self-reported humility given the
inherent paradox in reporting on one’s own humility. Some definitions have focused on
intrapersonal qualities (e.g., accurate or moderate view of self), whereas others
definitions have focused on interpersonal qualities (e.g., empathy, respect, lacking a sense
of superiority over others, or non-manipulative). Second, researchers have struggled to
measure humility. They strongly suspect that self-reports of humility are invalid because
truly humble people would probably rate their own humility modestly, whereas those low
in humility would probably rate their own humility generously. Although this effect has
not been empirically demonstrated, should it exist, it would undermine the validity of
self-reports of humility, particularly at the high end of humility scales. As I discussed in
Chapter 2, researchers have explored alternative measurement strategies, but each has
substantial limitations.
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To begin addressing these two problems, I introduced a theoretical model of
relational humility in Chapter 3, which included five propositions (P):
P1. Humility is ascribed in relationships
P2. Humility strengthens social bonds.
P3. Three sources of information that help people judge humility
P4. Humility is important in situations threaten relational hierarchies
P5. Humility information is communicated verbally and non-verbally
For researchers to study relational humility, two objectives must be met: (1) a
measure of humility judgments that aligns with the proposed definition of humility
should be developed; and (2) initial evidence for the tenets of the proposed model should
be provided.
To contribute to Objective 1, I developed the Relational Humility Scale (RHS).
The RHS was designed to assess humility judgments from the perspective of a third-party
within a specific relationship. I have provided evidence supporting its reliability,
construct validity, and criterion validity. In Study 1, I created a pool of 71 items to assess
humility based on previous definitions (e.g., accurate view of self, lack of superiority).
The 71-item version (called the RHS-71) was given to a sample of undergraduates, and
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted to examine the structure of the scale
and to evaluate its items. The final version yielded a three-factor scale with 16 items,
called the Relational Humility Scale (RHS). In Study 2, I replicated the factor structure
of the RHS on an independent sample using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).
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To contribute to Objective 2, I adduced evidence for the proposed model of
relational humility. In Study 3, I examined humility in the context of forming group
relationships. The use of a round-robin design (i.e., participants rated themselves and
other group members on measures) allowed me to examine two measure of humility
derived from the RHS: trait humility and self-enhancement of humility. I examined
several hypotheses designed to provide initial support for the proposed theoretical model.
Specifically, I examined whether (1) people tend to self-enhance when reporting their
humility, (2) self-enhancing was associated with other correlates of low humility, and (3)
a measure of trait humility (derived by using consensus among multiple informants)
predicted other theoretical constructs, such as personality traits that should be related to
humility (i.e., narcissism or agreeableness) or relationship acceptance or status in the
group.
In Study 4, I focused on how attributions of humility can affect specific
relationships, particularly in the context of conflict and forgiveness. In a 7-week
longitudinal study, college students who had recently been hurt in a romantic relationship
completed measures of forgiveness, humility, and spiritual similarity. I examined how
attributions of humility affected the victim’s degree of forgiveness towards an offender
and arrayed initial evidence for the contextual nature of humility attributions, testing
whether appraisals of spiritual similarity affected attributions of humility.
Study 1: Scale Refinement
The purposes of Study 1 were (a) to use EFA to determine the factor structure of
the RHS-71, (b) to winnow items to create a brief, face-valid measure of humility
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judgments; and (c) to provide initial evidence of internal consistency of the scale and
subscales.
Method (Study 1)
Participants. Participants were 300 undergraduate students (166 females) from a
large urban university. The mean age was 18.1 years (SD = 5.0). The sample was
ethnically diverse (57.3% White/Caucasian, 15.3% Black/African American, 18.0%
Asian/Asian American, 4.0% Latino/Latina, and 4.7% Other or did not report).
Measures.
Humility judgments (RHS-71). I generated a list of 71 face-valid items that
corresponded with my proposed definition of relational humility and with previous
definitions of humility (see Appendix A). Participants rated the humility of a parent by
indicating their agreement with items using a 5-point rating scale ranging from 1 =
strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. Example items include ―He/she has a humble
character,‖ ―He/she has a big ego,‖ and ―He/she knows him/herself well.‖
Procedure. Participants were recruited from undergraduate classes and
participated in exchange for partial course credit. After giving consent, participants rated
the humility of one of their parents using the RHS-71 through a secure online medium
(i.e., Sona-Systems©). A parent was chosen as the target, because this is a relationship in
which participants likely know the target person very well, but depending on the nature
of the relationship, they may not necessarily get along with the person or view the person
as humble. After completing questionnaires, participants were debriefed and given the
contact information of the researcher should they have any questions.
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Hypotheses and Analyses (Study 1)
Hypothesis #1.
Statement. The RHS will have simple factor structure.
Justification. I did not have a priori predictions on the number of factors that
would best explain the variance in RHS-71 items. I used empirical methods to determine
whether items’ variances were caused by one or several latent factors.
Analysis. To determine the factor structure of the RHS, I conducted an
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) using principal components analysis (PCA) on the
covariance matrix of items of the RHS-71. The number of factors was determined by
using the scree test (Cattell, 1966) and the Eigenvalue rule (Kaiser, 1960). Factors were
rotated using an oblique rotation so that each item was more likely to load substantially
on only one factor (DeVellis, 2003). I dropped items that did not load strongly on one
factor (at least .50) or that cross-loaded too high on a second factor (.25 or higher). Also,
I dropped items that were highly redundant with other items.
Hypothesis #2.
Statement. The RHS will show strong estimated internal consistency, both for the
overall scales and the individual subscales.
Justification. Scale items were created to assess the degree to which one
attributes humility to a target person. To the extent that items measure that construct,
they should be highly correlated with each other. DeVellis (2003) recommended that
Cronbach’s alphas of research instruments be in the vicinity of .80 (with somewhat
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higher or lower, .7 to .9 being satisfactory). Alphas that are .95 might have too many
items or assess a narrow latent construct.
Analysis. A Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was computed for the RHS and its two
subscales.
Results and Discussion (Study 1)
The correlation matrix for all humility items was analyzed using an EFA with
Maximum Likelihood estimation (Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999) with
an oblique (OBLIM) rotation. A three-factor solution best fit the data based on the Scree
test (Cattell, 1966). After examining the content of items, the factors were named Global
Humility (e.g., ―He/she has a humble character‖), Superiority (e.g., ―He/she has a big
ego‖), and Accurate View of Self (e.g., ―He/she knows him/herself well‖). Items were
dropped that did not load at least .50 on their primary factor, or that loaded over .25 on
any secondary factor. In addition, two items were dropped from the Global Humility
factor because they were highly redundant with other items.
The final version of the RHS consisted of 16 items, with three factors that are
theoretically consistent with the proposed definition of relational humility. These were
named Global Humility—5 items; Superiority—7 items; Accurate View of Self—4
items. Descriptive statistics and factor loadings for RHS are listed in Table 1. The three
factors accounted for 63.9% of the variance in items. The Cronbach’s alphas for the full
scale and subscales were .89 for the full scale, .92 for Global Humility, .87 for
Superiority, and .82 for Accurate View of Self. The intercorrelations among the
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subscales were r =- .45 for Global Humility and Superiority; r = .40 for Global Humility
and Accurate View of Self; and r = -.26 for Superiority and Accurate View of Self.
These findings provide initial evidence that the RHS has a simple, three-factor
structure, composed of face-valid humility, low expression of superiority, and
knowledgeable accuracy in one’s view of self. Because items were winnowed based on
the characteristics of one sample, I replicated the factor structure in a different sample in
Study 2.
Study 2: Replication of the Factor Structure on an Independent Sample
The findings of Study 1 yielded a three-factor solution for a 16-item scale of
humility. The purposes of Study 2 were (a) to replicate the three-factor structure of the
RHS in a different sample and (b) to provide additional evidence of the internal
consistency of the scale and subscales.
Method (Study 2)
Participants. Participants were 196 undergraduate students (122 females) from a
large urban university. The mean age was 19.1 years (SD = 2.95). The sample was
ethnically diverse (55.1% White/Caucasian, 16.8% Black/African American, 17.3%
Asian/Asian American, 4.1% Latino/Latina, and 6.7% Other or did not report).
Measures.
Humility judgments. Participants completed the RHS, as winnowed to 16 items
and three subscales—Global Humility, Superiority, and Accurate View of Self—from
Study 1 (see Appendix A).
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Procedure. Participants were recruited from undergraduate classes and
participated as part of a course requirement or in exchange for partial course credit. After
giving consent, participants rated the humility of a parent using the RHS through a secure
online medium. After completing questionnaires, participants were debriefed and given
the contact information of the researcher should they have any questions.
Hypotheses and Analyses (Study 2)
Hypothesis #1.
Statement. A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) will result in a good fit of the
three-factor model of the RHS to the data.
Justification. It was important to replicate the factor structure found in Study 1,
because items were dropped based on the characteristics of that sample. Replication
would provide initial evidence that the factor structure will be stable in other samples.
Analysis. I computed a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). I sought a CFI of .95
or higher, an RMSEA of .06 or less, and other indices of good fit of the model to the data.
Hypothesis #2
Statement. The RHS will show strong estimated internal consistency, both for the
overall scales and the individual subscales.
Justification. Scale items were created to assess judgments of the target’s
humility. To the extent that items measure that construct, they should be highly
correlated with each other.
Analysis. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients were computed for the RHS and its three
subscales for the sample.
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Results and Discussion (Study 2)
The covariance matrix was analyzed with Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation
using MPLUS 8.1. Items of the RHS were used as indicators of the Global Humility,
Superiority, and Accurate View of Self factors, which were modeled as correlated
factors. For each model, several fit indices were examined to evaluate the overall fit of
the model—the Chi-square value, the comparative fit index (CFI), the square-root-meanresidual (SRMR), and the root-mean-square-error-approximation (RMSEA). As a rule of
thumb, a CFI around .95 and an RMSEA equal or less than .06 suggest good fit (Hu &
Bentler, 1999). The three-factor model showed good fit, χ2(101) = 168.21, p < .001, CFI
= .96, SRMR = .05, RMSEA = .06. For the current sample, the Cronbach’s alpha
coefficients were .90 for the Full Scale, .92 for the Global Humility subscale, .82 for the
Superiority subscale, and .79 for the Accurate View of Self subscale. Thus, the results of
Study 2 provide additional evidence for the factor structure and internal consistency of
the RHS as I replicated the factor structure of the scale with an independent sample.
Study 3: Adducing Initial Evidence for the Model of Relational Humility
In Study 3, I sought to provide initial evidence for the proposed theoretical model
of relational humility as well as evidence of construct validity for the RHS. Namely,
using round-robin design, I investigated evidence of construct validity for measures of
humility derived from the social relations model (Kenny, 1994): (a) trait humility,
derived using consensus among several raters; and (b) self-enhancement of humility,
derived using the componential approach proposed by Kwan et al. (2004). The ad hoc
groups were portrayed as groups to assess ―leadership.‖ One self-presentational and two
55

mildly competitive tasks were used in each group, providing a variety of pressured
situations for individuals to act in within each group. It was expected that humility (or its
absence) would be seen within the groups. Each of the group members rated himself or
herself and all group members after the group tasks were complete.
To estimate trait humility, SOREMO (Kenny, 1995) was used to estimate social
relations model (Kenny, 1994). The model requires round-robin designs, wherein
participants meet in groups of at least three and complete measures for all group members
including themselves. The program generates two scores for each participant: (a) a target
effect, how a person is generally seen by others; and (b) a perceiver effect, how a person
generally sees other people. The perceiver effect was used to measure trait humility, as it
represents the consensus in how a person was perceived by group members. This is
consonant with our approach to understanding relational humility as a personality
judgment.
To estimate the target’s self-enhancement of humility, I used a componential
approach (Kwan et al., 2004; 2008). The approach is a methodological innovation that
combines, and thus adjusts for confounds in, the two ways that self-enhancement has
been traditionally studied (i.e., social comparisons and self-insights; see Chapter 2).
Humility researchers have theorized that as actual humility decreases, individuals should
give increasingly inflated ratings of their own humility (modesty hypothesis for selfreports of humility; see Chapters 2 and 3). To examine this hypothesis, I examined
whether self-enhancement of humility was related to other measure that should
correspond with low humility (e.g., narcissism, low agreeableness).
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Method (Study 3)
Participants. Participants (N = 84) were recruited through Sona-Systems© from
Virginia Commonwealth University. The mean age was 21.2 (SD = 5.6). Participants
were 51.2% male, 41.7% White/Caucasian, 25.0% Black/African American, 7.1%
Asian/Pacific Islander, 6.0% Hispanic, and 20.2% Other. In terms of religious affiliation,
the sample was 52.4% Christian, 27.4% Atheist/Agnostic/None, 8.3% Muslim, 6.0%
Hindu, 1.2% Jewish, and 4.8% Other.
Overview of Measures. Below, I describe the measures that participants and
informants completed in Study 3, including round-robin measures that participants
completed at three time-points (see Appendix B), and personality measures that
participants completed once at the beginning of the study (see Appendix C). Means,
Standard deviations, alphas, skewness, and kurtosis for all measures are included in Table
2.
Round-robin Measures. Because numerous measures had to be completed on
each group member several times, it was necessary to use brief assessments. I employed
those used in previous research to provide continuity across the literature.
Humility. After each of the three group activities, each participant privately rated
the humility of every other group member including themselves using the 5-item Global
Humility subscale of the RHS.
Brief five-factor model. The 15 items used in Kwan et al. (2008) were used to
assess the big five personality traits (3-items for each trait; see Appendix B).
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Table 2
Means, SD, Alphas, Skewness, and Kurtosis of Variables used in Study 3
Variable
N
α Min Max
M
SD Skew Kurtosis
Humility
1009 .94
5
25 18.12 4.41
-.09
-.39
Self-reports
Narcissism
80 .69
0
14 6.14 3.10
.24
-.26
Openness
83 .70
26
47 38.64 5.18
-.06
-.96
Conscientiousness
83 .88
20
45 31.02 5.81
.13
-.53
Extraversion
83 .85
17
39 29.04 6.02
-.23
-.93
Agreeableness
83 .81
19
45 34.81 5.64
-.43
.01
Neuroticism
82 .76
11
38 20.94 5.40
.33
.14
Anxious Attachment
76 .88
22 116 64.46 21.87
.16
-.35
Avoidant Attachment
76 .92
24 114 53.95 17.08
.58
.75
Religious Commitment
84 .95
10
50 23.10 11.33
.51
-.77
Round-robin measures
Openness (3 items)
1009 .32
3
15 9.34 2.18
.03
.36
Conscientiousness (3
1009 .79
3
15 10.75 2.64
-.29
-.17
items)
Extraversion (3 items)
1009 .88
3
15 11.23 2.91
-.56
-.33
Agreeableness (3 items)
1009 .85
3
15 11.98 2.45
-.45
-.49
Neuroticism (3 items)
1009 .74
3
15 10.61 2.55
-.09
-.41
Status (6 items)
1009 .91
6
30 23.79 5.26
-.88
.37
Acceptance (5 items)
1009 .84
5
25 18.11 4.57
-.53
-.02
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Acceptance. The five-item measure used by Anderson et al. (2006) was used to
assess acceptance in the group (see Appendix B).
Status. The six-item measure used by Anderson et al. (2006) was used to assess
status in the group (see Appendix B).
Target scores round-robin measures. The software program SOREMO (Kenny,
1995) was used to implement the social relations model analysis of round-robin ratings
(i.e., humility, status, acceptance, and big five). SOREMO calculated two scores for each
participant: a target score, which measures how that person was generally perceived by
others in the group, and a perceiver score, which measures how that person generally
perceived others. The program removed group differences so that target scores and
perceiver scores were independent of group membership (Kenny & LaVoie, 1984).
Relative variances for target scores, perceiver scores, and relationship scores are listed in
Table 3; reliabilities of estimates are listed in Table 4.
Self-enhancement of humility. The round-robin design was used to calculate the
measure of self-enhancement recently developed by Kwan and colleagues (Kwan et al.,
2004). The method helps minimize confounds associated with the two traditional ways
that self-enhancement has been studied (i.e., self-insights or social comparisons) by
combining both approaches using target scores, perceiver scores, and self-scores derived
through SOREMO. The self-enhancement index was calculated as: SE = S-T-P-G (SE =
self-enhancement; S = self-perception; T = group-deviated target score; P = the group-
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deviated perceiving score; G = the group mean). The SE ranged from -25.05 to 24.67,
with high scores signifying higher levels of SE.
Table 3
Relative Variances Calculated Using SOREMO in Study 3
Variable
Actor
Partner
Relationship
Humility
.65*
.05*
.29
Openness
.55*
.07*
.37
Conscientiousness
.55*
.26*
.19
Extraversion
.30*
.35*
.35
Agreeableness
.54*
.18
.28
Neuroticism
.43*
.00
.56
Status
.29*
.38*
.33
Acceptance
.42*
.16*
.42
*p < .05
Note. Relative variance should be significant in order to interpret actor or partner scores,
but the relationship variance is a residual of 1 minus actor and partner estimates, and
significance tests were not computed on these estimates.
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Table 4
Consensus among Raters Calculated using SOREMO in Study 3 across an Average of
3.84 Raters
Variable
Actor
Partner
Humility
.84
.31
Openness
.79
.33
Conscientiousness
.87
.77
Extraversion
.68
.71
Agreeableness
.82
.60
Neuroticism
.65
.00
Status
.69
.74
Acceptance
.71
.48
Note. These estimates represent the reliability of scores across raters. For example, the
partner score of .31 for humility is an estimate of consensus among raters. Above .50
suggests strong agreement; above .30, moderate agreement; less than .30, weak
agreement.
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Measures of personality Completed as Self-Reports
Narcissism. The 16-item version of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI16; Ames, Rose, & Anderson, 2005) was used to assess narcissism. Respondents chose
between paired response options (e.g., ―I know that I am good because everyone keeps
telling me so‖ or ―When people compliment me, I sometimes get embarrassed‖). The
NPI-16 showed evidence of estimated reliability, with alphas ranging from .65 to .72
across five studies (Ames et al.) of construct validity. It was related strongly to the 40item version (r = .90; Raskin & Terry, 1988). In addition, it was correlated with other
constructs such as agreeableness, self-esteem, and reported power and attractiveness.
Five factor model. The 44-item Big Five Inventory (Johnson, Donahue, &
Kentle, 1991) was used to assess the five-factors personality model (i.e., neuroticism,
extraversion, openness, agreeableness, conscientiousness). Items were completed on a
five-point rating scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. John and
Srivastava (1999) reported Cronbach’s alphas for the subscales ranging from .75-.80 and
estimates of 3-month temporal stability ranging between .80 and .90. The subscales were
found to be highly correlated with longer versions of the five-factor model such as the
NEO (Costa & McCrae, 1992).
Adult attachment. The 36-item Experiences in Close Relationships (ECR;
Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998) Scale was used to assess adult attachment styles. The
ECR has two subscales: Anxiety and Avoidance. Items are completed with a 7-point
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. An example
item is ―I worry about being abandoned.‖ The measure demonstrated strong estimated
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internal consistency, and evidence for discriminant and concurrent validity through
cluster analysis and comparisons with other attachment measures (Brennan et al., 1998).
Procedure. Participants signed up for a study on leadership through SonaSystems©. They came to the research lab and completed an initial survey that included
demographics and personality measures. Then, they completed three activities in groups
of 3 to 5 participants. There were 22 groups. For the first activity, participants were told
to each describe their strengths and weaknesses as a leader. For the second activity, they
completed the Man on the Moon Task (Robins & Beer, 2001), in which they imagined
being members of a space crew that, originally scheduled to rendezvous with a mother
ship on the moon, was forced to land 200 miles away due to mechanical difficulties. For
the 15 undamaged items, they group had to agree on how to rank the importance of each
item for the crew’s survival. The task is often used to assess leadership or group/team
dynamics. In the present instance, the task provided a mildly competitive venue in which
a cooperative solution had to be arrived at. This was expected to give humility and other
personal qualities a chance to manifest and be observed within the group. For the third
activity, participants completed GRE questions as a group, and they had to agree on the
answer to each item before moving on to the next. The rationale of all of these three
activities was to allow participants ample opportunity to observe humility-related
behaviors in group members.
According to Kenny (2004), the benefits of knowing a target person are achieved
rather early within a relationship (somewhere around 100 observations of behavior). The
first activity had participants explicitly present themselves to the group, giving group
63

members an initial chance to judge the modesty and sincerity of the person’s selfpresentation. Given that the study was presented as an investigation of leadership, the
second activity presented an opportunity for participants to vie for influence within the
group. The third activity included a clear performance task, which might intensify group
dynamics and struggle for status within the group. After each activity, participants
completed round-robin ratings of themselves and other group members. Thus, data were
collected at 3 time points.
Hypotheses and Analyses (Study 3)
Hypothesis#1.
Statement. There will be evidence of a modesty effect for self-reports of
humility. Namely, I examined whether humble individuals would modestly under-report
their own humility, whereas low humility individuals would self-enhance their humility.
Justification. The purpose of Hypothesis 1 was to investigate whether,
when rating their own humility, people tend to rate themselves modestly. Some
researchers have theorized that humility should be inversely related to self-enhancing
behavior (e.g., Peterson & Seligman, 2004); however, little empirical research has
examined this assertion. Rowatt et al. (2006) found that other-reports of humility were
negatively related to self-reports of their humility, but this may be a characteristic of selfother agreement for evaluative traits in general (e.g., Murray et al., 1996).
Analysis. I tested this hypothesis in two ways. First, I examined elevation
accuracy, which is the difference in mean scores between self-ratings and informantratings (Cronbach, 1955). To avoid interdependence of individual data, I examined mean
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self-report and other-report scores for the 22 groups. I conducted a 2 x 2 mixed groups
ANOVA on personality judgment scores at Time 3 (I used ratings at Time 3 because
Kenny, 2004, has demonstrated that consensus among raters tends to plateau at around 3
hours of observation). Second, I examined differential accuracy, which was estimated by
examining the correlations between self-reports and informant reports of humility (Time
3). Namely, I examined the correlation between self-reports and other-reports
(aggregated) for ratings of humility and agreeableness, controlling for group membership
(21 dummy coded variables for N-1 groups).
Hypothesis #2.
Statement. Self-enhancement of humility ratings will show evidence of
construct validity. Self-enhancement of humility will be associated positively with
narcissism, avoidant attachment, and anxious attachment, and negatively with
agreeableness.
Justification. I have conceptualized self-enhancement of humility as a
form of immodest behavior. Accordingly, I predicted that self-enhancement of humility
would be associated with correlates of low humility, such as narcissism, attachment style,
or low agreeableness.
Analysis. Pearson’s r correlations were conducted between selfenhancement of humility and narcissism, agreeableness, and attachment style (each at
Time 3).
Hypothesis#3.
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Statement. Self-enhancement of humility will be negatively associated
with acceptance and status target scores (Time 3).
Justification. If self-enhancement of humility is a form of immodest
behavior, then it should be associated negatively with relationship qualities in developing
groups (i.e., lower status and acceptance).
Analysis. I conducted Pearson’s r correlations of self-enhancement with
status and acceptance target scores (each Time 3).
Hypothesis #4.
Statement. Trait humility (target scores) will show evidence of construct
validity, being predictably related to other personality traits, such as narcissism (-),
agreeableness (+), openness (+), and neuroticism (-).
Justification. To the extent that aggregating humility judgments is a valid
way to estimate a person’s trait humility, the estimate should predict constructs that are
theoretically related to humility. Accordingly, in prior research, humility or modesty
measures have been positively associated with agreeableness (see Ashton & Lee, 2007,
for a review) and openness to experience (i.e., akin to ideological humility), and
negatively associated with narcissism (e.g., Rowatt et al., 2006).
Analysis. Pearson’s r correlations were conducted between trait humility
(target scores at Time 3) and other personality constructs.
Hypothesis#5.
Statement. Trait humility will be positively associated with positive
relationship in developing groups, namely higher acceptance and lower status.
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Justification. An important contribution of the proposed model is that it
contextualizes the study of humility within actual relationships. In this hypothesis, I
examined the proposition that humility strengthens social bonds. Support for this
hypothesis would provide initial evidence that humility is important in forming
collaborative relationships.
Analysis. Pearson’s r correlations were conducted between trait humility
and other measures of relationship quality (Time 3). In addition, I conducted multi-level
modeling to examine how humility (Time 3) was related to growth curves of status and
acceptance (i.e., scores nested within individuals across three time-points).
Results and Discussion (Study 3)
Preliminary analyses. Before conducting the primary analyses, I checked the
data for outliers and normality. There were only a few outliers, and they fell within the
expected range of the variable and were thus retained. Variables had no problems with
normality (see skewness and kurtosis in Table 2).
Test of Hypothesis #1. I hypothesized that there would be evidence that people
tend to modestly rate their own humility. First, I examined the elevation accuracy (i.e.,
whether means were similar for self-reports compared with other reports) of humility and
agreeableness. I conducted a 2 x 2 (agreeableness or humility by self or other) mixed
groups ANOVA on personality judgments scores. The hypothesized interaction was not
found. Group means for self-reports and other-reports were not different for humility,
t(21)=.474, p =.64., or for agreeableness, t(21)=.25, p =.801.
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Second, I examined evidence of differential accuracy. Namely, I conducted
Pearson’s r correlations between self-reports and other-reports of humility and
agreeableness, controlling for group membership (i.e., 21 dummy codes were entered for
groups N -1). The self-other agreement for humility was -.31 (p=.013), whereas the selfother agreement for agreeableness was -.18 (p=.154).
Test of Hypothesis #2. I hypothesized that self-enhancement of humility would
show evidence of construct validity by being related to other personality traits associated
with low humility (i.e., agreeableness, narcissism, attachment style, neuroticism).
Pearson’s r correlations were conducted between self-enhancement of humility and
measures of other personality constructs. Results are reported in Table 5. Selfenhancement of humility was not related to self-reported agreeableness, narcissism,
neuroticism, or openness to experience, but it was associated with anxious attachment (r
= .29, p = .012).
Test of Hypothesis #3. I hypothesized that self-enhancement of humility would
be associated with lower status and acceptance in a forming group. Pearson’s r
correlations were conducted between self-enhancement and target scores for acceptance
and status. Self-enhancement of humility was not related to current status or acceptance
in the group (see Table 5).
Test of Hypothesis #4. I hypothesized that trait humility would show evidence of
construct validity by being associated with personality traits related to humility.
Pearson’s r correlations were conducted between trait humility and other personality
traits. Trait humility was negatively related to self-reported anxious attachment style,
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narcissism, and neuroticism, and was positively related to conscientiousness and
agreeableness (see Table 5). Likewise, trait humility was negatively related to
neuroticism target scores, and was positively related to target scores for agreeableness,
openness, and conscientiousness (see Table 5).
Test of Hypothesis #5. I hypothesized that trait humility would be related to
positive relationship qualities in a developing group (i.e., acceptance and status).
Pearson’s r correlations were conducted between trait humility and target scores for
status and acceptance at Time 3. As predicted, trait humility was positively related to
status and acceptance in the group.
I used multi-level modeling to examine how trait humility (estimated at Time 3
because according to Kenny, 2004, consensus in personality judgments plateaus around
100 observations, or around 3 hours) was associated with growth curves of status and
acceptance in a forming group.
I tested a series of models with status as the dependent variable. Several
preliminary models were tested in order to confirm that variability existed in the
intercepts and slopes. Then I tested a model with trait humility as a level-2 covariate.
The interaction of trait humility with time was marginally significant (est = .08, SE = .04,
p = .067), suggesting that people with higher trait humility increased more in acceptance
than those with lower trait humility. Trait humility accounted for 4% of the unexplained
variance in slopes from the unconditional growth curve model.
Next, I examined a series of models with acceptance as the dependent variable.
After ensuring that variability existed in both intercepts and slopes, I examined a model
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with trait humility as a level-2 covariate. As predicted, there was a significant interaction
between humility and time (est = .06, SE=.03, p = .018), suggesting that people with
higher trait humility increased more in acceptance over time than those with lower trait
humility. The addition of trait humility to the model accounted for an additional 14% of
the variance in slopes from the unconditional growth curve model.
Summary and discussion of findings in Study 3. In sum, in Study 3, I
empirically tested several propositions that were put forth in Chapter 3. First, I
empirically investigated the evidence of a modesty effect for self-reports of humility and
whether self-enhancement of humility is related to low humility. Consistent with Rowatt
et al. (2006), I found that self-reports of humility were negatively related to other-reports.
However, I found little evidence that self-enhancement of humility was associated with
correlates of low humility, such as narcissism, agreeableness, group status, or group
acceptance.
I hesitate to over-interpret these null findings. I might tentatively conclude that
these findings cast doubt on Tangney’s conclusion that self-reports of humility are
inherently doomed (Tangney, 2000). To address this issue more definitively, additional
empirical investigations are needed that compare the ability of self-reports and otherreports to predict behavioral expression of humility.
Second, I found initial support for the proposed model of relational humility, as
well as for using multiple raters to estimate trait humility. Consistent with the hypothesis
that negative emotions in the target would be related to lower relational humility, both
neuroticism and anxious attachment style were negatively related to trait humility. Also,
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consistent with the proposition that humility strengthens social bonds, I found trait
humility predicted both status and acceptance in forming groups. Also, trait humility was
predictably related to agreeableness, consistent with studies that have measured humility
with the HEXACO-PI (for a review, see Ashton & Lee, 2007).
Study 4: Humility and Forgiveness
In the previous study, I used the RHS to estimate trait humility, as well as selfenhancement of humility. The focus of the present study was on how attributions of
humility affect specific relationships. Namely, I examined the proposition that humility
is best judged in situations that make it difficult to practice humility, such as during
conflict, while receiving recognition, or being in hierarchical relationships that are
involved in a power struggle.
One time when such conditions might occur is when romantic partners hurt or
offend each other. Specifically, this study investigated how attributions of humility
influenced a victim’s forgiveness of a romantic partner. One might hypothesize that a
person who has been offended by his or her partner would be more likely to forgive the
partner if the partner is perceived to be humble. Namely, judging the offender as humble
might indicate contrition and an intention to behave differently in the future, whereas
judging the offender as low in humility might indicate stubbornness and the likelihood of
future exploitation (Baumeister et al., 2007). In addition, I attempted to provide initial
evidence that relational factors can influence the attribution of humility. To provide one
example, I examined whether victims who saw the offender as more spiritually similar
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tended to view the offender as more humble than those who saw the offender as less
spiritually similar.
Method (Study 4)
Participants. Undergraduates (N = 123) were recruited through Sona-Systems©.
The mean age was 20.11 (SD = 1.99). Participants were 74.4% female, 28.1%
White/Caucasian, 43% Black/African American, 9.9% Asian, 7.4% other, 11.6%
missing.
Measures. Means, standard deviations, alphas, skewness, and kurtosis are
described in Table 6.
Humility judgments. Participants described the offender’s humility using the
RHS (described above).
Unforgiveness. The 12-item Transgression Related Interpersonal Motivations
(TRIM; McCullough et al., 1998) was used to assess state unforgiveness. The TRIM has
two subscales: Revenge (5 items; e.g., ―I’ll make him/her pay‖) and Avoidance (7 Items;
e.g., ―I keep as much distance between us as possible‖). Items were completed on a 5point rating scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. McCullough and
colleagues reported Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for scores on both subscales ranging
from .85 to .93 and estimates of three-week temporal stability ranging from.44 to .65.
Scores on the scale showed evidence of construct validity, and scores were found to be
negatively correlated with other measures of forgiveness, relationship satisfaction, and
commitment.
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Similarity of an Offender’s Spirituality. The 9-item Similarity of an Offender’s
Spirituality (SOS) Scale (Davis et al., 2009) was used to assess whether victim’s
appraised the relationship of the Sacred to an offender in order to deal with a
transgression. Participants responded to items on a 7-point rating scale ranging from 0 =
completely disagree to 6 = completely agree. The scale has two subscales: Spiritual
Similarity and Human Similarity. An example item for the Spiritual Similarity is ―I
thought about how similar my basic religious beliefs were to his/hers,‖ and for the
Human Similarity is ―I thought to myself that this person was a brother/sister human.‖
Cronbach’s alphas ranged from .87-.93 for Spiritual Similarity and from .79-.86 for
Human Similarity (Davis et al.). Furthermore, scores on the SOS also showed evidence
supporting construct validity, as it was correlated with religious commitment and other
measures of religiosity. In addition, scores showed evidence supporting criterion
validity. They were correlated with empathy and forgiveness.
Procedure. Participants who had recently been hurt in a romantic relationship
signed up for the study through Sona-Systems©. They came into the lab and completed a
survey, including a description of the transgression and several measures regarding the
offense and their relationship with the offender (i.e., RHS, SOS, TRIM). After
completing the lab visit, participants were emailed a weekly survey, which included
repeated measures of the RHS, SOS, and TRIM, once a week for the following six
weeks.
Hypotheses and Analyses (Study 4)
Hypothesis#1.
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Statement. Humility judgments will predict forgiveness over time.
Justification. Several theorists have claimed that humility is important to
whether a victim forgives. Prior research on humility and forgiveness has focused on
whether the victim’s humility is related to the victim’s forgiveness of an offender (e.g.,
Exline, Baumeister, Zell, Kraft, & Witvliet, 2008; Powers et al., 2007, Rowatt et al.,
2006; Shepherd & Belicki, 2008). However, in the present study, I examined how
relational humility (i.e., the degree to which the victim attributes humility to the offender)
affected the victim’s forgiveness of the offender over time.
Analysis. Multi-level regression models were conducted with
unforgiveness scores (i.e., revenge and avoidance) nested within individuals over time,
and with humility entered as a level-1 covariate. In order to provide some evidence of
the causal direction between humility and unforgiveness, unforgiveness scores were
lagged by one week (Kenny & Campbell, 1999).
Hypothesis #2.
Statement. Spiritual similarity will be positively related to relational
humility.
Justification. The proposed model suggests that people attribute humility
based, in part, on their particular relationship with the target person. Accordingly,
similarity in spiritual worldview may influence how individuals attribute humility to a
target person. To provide initial evidence for this proposition, I examined whether
people attributed greater humility to offenders that they deemed as more spiritually
similar.
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Analysis. Multi-level regression models were used to examine how
appraisals of spiritual similarity (at Time 1) were related to relational humility (RHS
global scores) nested within individual over time. After testing several base models (i.e.,
unconditional growth curve model; constraining variance components to be zero), I
examined a model in which spiritual similarity scores (Time 1) were entered as a level-2
predictor.
Results and Discussion (Study 4)
Preliminary analysis. Before conducting the primary analyses, I checked the
data for outliers and normality. There were only a few outliers, and they fell within the
expected ranges of the variables and were thus retained. Variables had no problems with
normality (see Table 6).
Hypothesis #1. I hypothesized that attributions of humility would be positively
associated with unforgiveness. To test this hypothesis, I conducted a series of multi-level
regression models with unforgiveness scores nested within individuals over time. In
several preliminary models, I established that there was variability in the intercepts and
slopes and that a linear model—not a curvilinear one—best fit the data. I then entered
relational humility as a level-1 covariate. Forgiveness scores were lagged by one timepoint, so that models reflected how humility scores were related to subsequent levels of
forgiveness across the course of the study. Both Global Humility (est = -.28, SE=.10 p =
.007) and Superiority (est = .19, SE=.08, p = .019) were significant predictors of lagged
unforgiveness scores. These findings suggests that, across the course of the study,
viewing the offender as more humble was related to lower unforgiveness the following
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week, and that viewing the offender as more superior was related to higher unforgiveness
the following week.
Hypothesis #2. I hypothesized that appraisals of spiritual similarity (Time 1)
would predict initial humility status and also changes in relational humility. To test this
hypothesis, I conducted a series of multi-level regression models with relational humility
scores nested within individuals over time. In several preliminary models, I established
that there was variability in the intercepts and slopes and that a linear model—not a
curvilinear one—best fit the data. Then, I entered relational humility as a level-2
covariate. There was a main effect for SOS (est = .17, SE=.02, p < .001), suggesting that
higher appraisals of spiritual similarity were associated with higher relational humility
across the study. There was a marginally significant interaction term (est = -.002,
SE=.0009, p = .052), suggesting that relational humility declined over time for those
attributed with higher spiritual similarity, whereas it increased over time for those
attributed with lower spiritual similarity.
In sum, Study 3 offered initial evidence that relational humility is important in the
context of conflict. Namely, in a sample of undergraduates who had recently suffered a
transgression in a romantic relationship, relational humility predicted lagged
unforgiveness scores. A number of studies have found humility in the victim to be
associated with forgiveness; however, this was a first study to show that relational
humility (i.e., a victim’s attribution of humility to an offender) was related to the
unfolding of forgiveness. Likewise, a key implication of a relational approach to
studying humility is that contextual factors may affect whether people attribute humility.
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Offering initial support for this notion, I found that appraisals of spiritual similarity were
associated with judgments of relational humility. Spiritual similarity is one of many
relational factors (e.g., cultural norms regarding modesty or gender) that may influence
attributions of humility.

80

Chapter 5: General Discussion
The purpose of the present dissertation was to present initial theorizing and
empirical work that might help catalyze research on humility. In my review of the
literature in Chapter 2, I called for greater innovation in theory and measurement are
needed in order for the study of humility to advance. Also, I suggested that
conceptualizing humility as a relational construct and using informant raters might
provide avenues for studying humility. Towards that end, in Chapter 3, I elaborated on a
theoretical model of relational humility consisting of five propositions. Then, in Chapter
4, I presented four empirical studies that described the development of the Relational
Humility Scale (RHS) and offered initial evidence for the proposed model of relational
humility. Here in Chapter 5, I provide a general discussion that considers evidence for
the proposed model of relational humility, the status of the RHS in its development,
limitations of the presented studies, and directions for future research.
Evidence for the Proposed Model of Relational Humility
P1: Humility is ascribed within relationships. I suggested a conceptual shift
that aligned the study of humility with a vast literature on personality judgments.
Relational humility was defined having an integrity between thought, behavior and
motivation, including intrapersonal modesty (i.e., having an accurate view of self) and
interpersonal modesty and humility (i.e., lack of superiority; regulating self-oriented
emotions in socially acceptable ways; acting in other-oriented ways, such as showing
respect, sacrificing for others, expressing empathy, and so forth). Study 3 provided initial
evidence for Proposition 1. Trait humility, as measured by consensus among several
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raters in an ad hoc relationship with a target, was associated with consensus ratings of
agreeableness and conscientiousness, factors of the big-five that have been associated
with self-control (McCullough et al., 2009). Trait humility as ascribed to a target was
also negatively associated with narcissism ascribed to that target within the ad hoc
relationship. Furthermore, as predicted, trait humility was negatively associated with
traits related to expression of negative emotion (i.e., neuroticism and anxious
attachment). Note that in the Kwan design, every person was a target and all others rated
them. Thus, in the present set of studies, Study 3 supports P1—that people rating each
other within relationships ascribe humility when humility is due and it is related to other
traits theorized to be related to humility.
Furthermore, an implication of the proposed model is that relational factors—
including characteristics of the judge, the target, or information available to the judge—
can affect attributions of humility. In Study 4, I provided an example, showing that
appraisals of spiritual similarity by a person who had been offended by his or her
romantic partner were associated with attributions of humility.
I also examined the hypothesis that self-enhancement of humility by the target
may undermine the validity of self-reports of his or her own humility. I found limited
evidence for this hypothesis in Study 3. Although self-reports of humility were
negatively correlated with other-reports of humility, the effect was small and was not
present when controlling for self-enhancement on agreeableness. Furthermore, selfenhancement of humility (Kwan et al.’s, 2004) showed little evidence of being related to
low humility. The measure was unrelated to narcissism, agreeableness,
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conscientiousness, status, or acceptance. An important question, which I did not consider
in the present studies, is whether other-reports predict behavioral expressions of humility
better than do self-reports (Vazire, 2010). The evidence from Study 3 suggested that,
while other reports of humility are indeed predictive of relationship-derived personality
judgments, self-reports of humility might not be as vexing and contradiction-laden as
Tangney (2009) had concluded. Perhaps a combination of other- and self-reported
humility will provide the most robust picture of humility.
P2: Humility helps strengthen social bonds. In Chapter 3, I elaborated
on the importance of humility for strengthening social bonds. The findings in Studies 3
and 4 provided indirect support for this proposition. Namely, in Study 3, being viewed as
humble by others (trait humility) was associated with being more accepted and having
greater status in a forming group. In addition, forgiveness is an important to the
maintenance of a relationship bond. In Study 4, victims who saw the offender as humble
reported less unforgiveness towards that person over time. One way to test this
proposition more directly might be to assess the strength of a social bond with a measure
of relationship commitment. For example, one might test whether judgments of humility
mediate the relationship between sacrifice behaviors and increases in commitment of
partners.
P3: Three sources of information help people judge humility. I proposed that
people judge humility drawing from their current emotions, past behavior of the target
person, and the current emotions of the target person. This proposition was not tested
directly, although Study 3 provided initial evidence that having greater negative emotion
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was associated with being viewed as less humble. Namely, participants who rated
themselves as more neurotic and anxious were viewed as less humble by others. A more
direct test of this hypothesis would involve experimental designs, such as manipulating
emotions in the judge or the victim.
P4: Humility Is Best Judged in Situations that Make it Difficult to Practice. I
did not test this proposition. To do so would have tested a variety of situations against
each other. But I provided initial evidence that in one of the situations—conflict as
shown by a transgression within romantic partnerships—humility judgments are
important. Initial evidence supported the proposition that relational humility is important
in the context of conflict. Namely, in Study 4, I examined humility in the context of
conflict in romantic relationships. Previous theory and research on forgiveness has
focused on humility of the victim, proposing that humility can promote empathy and
dissipate feelings of disgust and moral superiority towards the offender (e.g., Sandage,
1999; Worthington, 1998). For example, self-reports of humility have been positively
associated with trait forgivingness (Rowatt et al., 2006; Shepherd & Belicki, 2008).
Moreover, victims are more likely to forgive an offense if they can imagine themselves
committing a similar offense (Exline, Baumeister, et al., 2008; Exline, Zell, Malcolm,
DeCourville, & Belicki, 2008). This study was the first to investigate how relational
humility—a victim’s attribution of humility to an offender—affects the unfolding of
forgiveness.
P5: Humility information is communicated verbally and non-verbally.
Evidence for this proposition was not examined in the present studies; however this is an
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important area for future study. For example, researchers might manipulate individuals
access to information about a target person to study how judges prioritize humilityrelated information (e.g., direct observation, negative/positive reports from
friends/rivals).
Status Report on the Development of the RHS
The RHS was developed as a face-valid measure of humility judgments. In
contrast with other self-report measures of humility—e.g., the Modesty-Humility
subscale of the Values in Action Inventory (Peterson & Seligman, 2004) or the HonestyHumility subscale of the HEXACO-PI (Lee & Ashton, 2004)—its items were evaluated
while being used for other-reports rather than self-reports. Given the paradox of
reporting one’s own humility, it was important to evaluate items being used for otherreport rather than self-report.
In Study 1, the RHS was found to have a three-factor structure, including
subscales that assess Global Humility (5-items), Superiority (7-items), and Accurate
View of Self (4-items). Consistent with the proposed definition, the instrument includes
both intrapersonal and interpersonal aspects of humility, as well as a subscale that reflects
an overall integrity between these two aspects. The factor structure of the RHS was
replicated in an independent sample, and the subscales showed acceptable estimates of
internal consistency.
As discussed in the prior section, the RHS showed initial evidence of construct
validity. In Study 3, trait humility was predictably related to other personality traits and
group status and acceptance. Furthermore, RHS subscales were used to study relational
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humility, a victim’s attribution of humility to an offender. As predicted, relational
humility was related to forgiveness over time and appraisals of spiritual similarity.
Although this initial evidence is promising, evidence of a scale’s psychometric properties
accumulates over time. An important next step in the development of the RHS is to
establish evidence of its incremental predictive validity compared with other measures of
humility, such as the HH (Ashton & Lee, 2004) or the MH (Peterson & Seligman, 2004).
Limitations of the Empirical Studies
The present set of studies had several limitations. First, only college students
were studied. It is important to examine humility judgments in other populations—
particularly in relationships involving hierarchical roles (e.g., supervisor-subordinate, or
teacher-student relationships). Second, only one method of measurement was used (i.e.,
survey ratings by self or other). In the future, it will be important to show how humility
judgments (as measured by the RHS) are related to physiological (e.g., are RHS ratings
related to more emotional calmness during, for example, discussions of relational trust?),
behavioral (e.g., are RHS ratings related to fewer uses of personal pronouns, fewer
defensive verbalizations, and fewer non-verbal defensive behaviors?), or cognitive (e.g.,
are RHS ratings related to scores on the IAT-HA) measures.
Future Research
Resolving definitional disputes and developing measures. Given that humility
research is in an early phase, I expect other researchers will put forth alternative
definitions of humility and develop associated measures. By conceptualizing humility as
relational, I have emphasized that individuals attribute both internal and interpersonal
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qualities of humility based on a person behavior within relationships, as well as
communication between individuals within a community. The RHS provides one
example of a measure developed primarily for other-reports. To provide assurance in
measurement, it is necessary to continue to add to construct and criterion-related validity
of the RHS, as well as other measures.
The present dissertation certainly did not resolve the measurement issues that
have thwarted the study of humility; however, it clarified some promising directions for
future research. For example, in Study 3, I employed one approach of testing the widely
held assumption that humility self-reports are inherently flawed. This initial inquiry did
not find strong evidence for such a conclusion. As with other psychological constructs—
and perhaps more so—the study of humility requires that researchers adopt multiple
methods of measurement.
A crucial next step is for researchers to reach consensus on behavioral expressions
of humility. This has proven to be a difficult task, because whether a behavior is humble
might depend highly on context. For example, expressing modesty after receiving an
honor might be considered very humble by some but as manipulative by others. Or the
same behavior in one setting or community (e.g., publically expressing thanks to God
during a religious service) might be seen as arrogant in another (e.g., a politician
publically expressing thanks to God during a campaign address at a religious convention
in view of highly secular audience). A relational approach suggests a different strategy.
Rather than researchers trying to decide what behaviors are humble—across all people
and situations, using their own pet theories—a more humble approach might be to begin
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studying humility as a social judgment: what behaviors are generally seen as humble, in
what situations, by what people?
Once researchers have reached some agreement on behavioral expressions of
humility (e.g., apologizing after a transgression or other conciliatory behaviors;
expressing gratitude or other stances that communicate interpersonal lowering), an
important next step is to compare the predictive validity of self-reports and other-reports
of humility. I suspect researchers will continue to search for a strong and easily
admissible trait measure. That said, I encourage researchers to keep in mind the
importance of relational humility, one person’s subjective judgment of another’s
humility, which is contextually most important to outcomes for a particular relationship
(e.g., whether a victim sees an offender as humble is most important to forgiveness and
reconciliation for that relationship; whether an employee sees a manager as humble is
most important to collaboration and trust in that relationship).
Theory testing. Now that initial measures of relational humility exist,
researchers should turn to testing some of the many implications of the proposed model
of relational humility. For example, when do other-reports of humility out-predict selfreports? Also, when are self-reports most likely to be biased? Accordingly, perhaps
researchers could develop a self-report measure that includes a validity scale based on
criterion-keyed items, validated using other-reports.
Aspects of the definition should be experimentally tested. For example, I
suggested that positive or negative emotion in the judge (or target) may influence
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attributions of humility. Accordingly, does priming positive or negative emotions—in
either the judge or target—change attributions of humility?
Also, the proposed definition suggests that humility is related to self-regulation.
As such, do ego depletion tasks inhibit a person’s ability to act humbly (e.g., participants
could be assigned to an ego depletion task before engaging in a videotaped argument with
a confederate, and several coders could then rate the participants humility based on their
behavior during the video).
Accordingly, researchers should continue to acquire evidence regarding the
benefits of humility, both for the target and the perceiver. Namely, researchers should
begin studying humility in a variety of relationships (e.g., managers, teachers, couples),
particularly in situations that challenge the hierarchy of relationships, such as during
conflict, while receiving praise or recognition, or in hierarchical relationships involved in
a power struggle.
Finally, once some of the low hanging fruit has been gathered, researchers should
examine some of the more nuanced hypothesized implied by the proposed model. For
example, the model implies that humility is subjectively easier (and less ambiguous) to
assess in others than in oneself. Modesty norms are likely more salient when describing
one’s own humility than when judging someone else’s humility. This should be tested.
Moreover, researchers might use previous research on personality judgments to explore
what relationship factors moderate how humility is judged (see Funder, 1995, for a
review). For example, convergence between self-and observer-reports should be higher
in relationships between people who know each other well than in relationships between
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strangers (Kenny, 2004); people may consider different qualities when judging the
humility of close friends versus acquaintances (McAdams & Pals, 2006); cultural or
spiritual factors may affect how people judge humility (Sandage, 1999; Emmons &
Kneezel, 2005); and humility judgments should be less stable than judgments of traits
such as extraversion or agreeableness.
Conclusion
For some time, the study of humility has been hampered by measurement
problems. Researchers have sought the Holy Grail of measures that can side-step the
paradox of self-reported humility. However, I conclude, at least on the basis of the
present limited dissertation, that the quest for the Holy Grail perhaps be laid aside or even
called off. Before researchers could ever know that they had found such a measure, they
would first need to be able to identify the behaviors that the trait of humility should
predict. Given the highly contextual nature of humility, this task alone is daunting.
Rather, I have conceptualized trait humility as a person’s reputation across relationships
and even communities. The approach aligns the study of humility with an expansive
body of research on personality judgments, providing an array of empirical questions that
will keep researchers, including myself, busy for years to come. I hope the introduction
of this model and scale will be an important step in catalyzing research on humility.
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Appendix A
RHS-71 and RHS-16
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Relational Humility Scale-71 Item Version (RHS-71)
DIRECTIONS: Please indicate the extent to which the following statements describe the
person being rated.
1 = strongly disagree
5 = strongly agree
1. He/she is a humble person.
2. Most people would consider him/her a humble person.
3. He/she has a humble character.
4. He or she is truly a humble person
5. His or her close friends would consider him/her humble.
6. He/she is humble.
7. He/she is not a humble person.
8. He/she acts humbly with me
9. Even strangers would consider him/her humble.
10. Not many would consider him/her humble.
11. I consider him/her one of my ―heroes of humility.‖
12. He/she is a great example of humility.
13. Humility is one of this person’s main characteristics.
14. He/she thinks of him/herself as overly important.
15. He/she has a big ego.
16. He/she thinks of him/herself too highly.
17. He/she seems aware of others’ needs.
18. He/she has the freedom to not be selfish.
19. He/she is free to think of others first.
20. He/she tends to share the credit with others.
21. He/she shares the spotlight.
22. He/she accepts deserved praise without making a big deal of it.
23. He/she likes to call attention to his/her accomplishments.
24. When he/she accomplishes something, he/she tells everyone right away.
25. He/she tries to impress others with false modesty.
26. He/she likes to talk about him/herself.
27. He/she does not like to talk about him/herself too much.
28. He/she is modest.
29. He/she is pretentious.
30. He/she is self-aware.
31. He/she knows his/her weaknesses.
32. He/she knows him/herself well
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33. He/she knows his/her strengths.
34. He/she is able to accept him/herself.
35. He/she is able to accept his/her own flaws.
36. He/she handles success well.
37. He/she deals with failure well.
38. He/she prefers not to ask for help.
39. He/she likes to be seen as tough.
40. He/she likes to be seen as invulnerable.
41. He/she does not like to show weakness.
42. He/she has a humble lifestyle.
43. He/she lives a humble life.
44. He/she lives a modest life.
45. He/she lives a down to earth life.
46. Certain tasks are beneath him/her.
47. He/she prefers to let others do the hard work.
48. He/she does not like doing menial tasks for others.
49. He/she strikes me as self-righteous.
50. I feel inferior when I am with him/her.
51. He/she is condescending.
52. He/she is arrogant.
53. He/she acts better than me.
54. He/she acts better than others.
55. It is refreshing to be around him/her.
56. He/she treats me with dignity.
57. I trust him/her.
58. He/she treats me with respect.
59. I admire him/her as a person.
60. I am drawn to his or her humility.
61. I want to be more humble like him/her.
62. His or her humility is attractive to others.
63. He/she is a moral person.
64. He/she is a good person.
65. He/she is an honest person.
66. He/she is authentic.
67. He/she enjoys serving others.
68. He/she often is in power struggles.
69. He/she often causes power struggles.
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70. He/she has a disarming manner.
71. He/she is gentle with others.
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Relational Humility Scale (RHS)
DIRECTIONS: Please indicate the extent to which the following statements describe the
person being rated.
1 = strongly disagree
5 = strongly agree
1. He/she has a humble character.
2. He or she is truly a humble person
3. Most people would consider him/her a humble person.
4. His or her close friends would consider him/her humble.
5. Even strangers would consider him/her humble.
6. He/she thinks of him/herself too highly.
7. He/she has a big ego.
8. He/she thinks of him/herself as overly important.
9. Certain tasks are beneath him/her.
10. I feel inferior when I am with him/her.
11. He/she strikes me as self-righteous.
12. He/she does not like doing menial tasks for others.
13. He/she knows him/herself well
14. He/she knows his/her strengths.
15. He/she knows his/her weaknesses.
16. He/she is self-aware
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Appendix B
Round-Robin Measures
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Time 1: After brief introduction: Please indicate the extent each item describes the
person—either yourself or other members in the group.
1 = not at all; 5 = completely
Self 1
Extraverted
Talkative
Sociable
Diligent
Careful
Cautious
Unworried
Relaxed
Carefree
Eager to change the status quo
Prefer novel ways
Prefer variety
Unselfish
Kind
Generous
Receive respect from other group members
Made valuable contributions
Demonstrated high ability
Influenced group decisions
Led the groups activities
Participanted and contributed in the group, overall
I would want to work with the person again
Earned trust
Similarity
Felt a lot in common with him/her
Felt different from him/her
I would want to work with him/her again
Earned other group members trust
He/she has a humble character.
He or she is truly a humble person
Most people would consider him/her a humble person.
His or her close friends would consider him/her humble.
Even strangers would consider him/her humble.
He/she tends to share the credit with others.
He/she shares the spotlight.
He/she accepts deserved praise without making a big deal
of it.
He/she is one of the most modest people I know.
He/she likes to call attention to his/her accomplishments.
He/she tries to impress others with false modesty.
He/she likes to be the center of attention.
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2

3

4

5

He/she likes to talk about him/herself.
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Big Five
DIRECTIONS: Please describe the extent to which you agree the following
statements describe the person you are rating.
1 = strongly disagree
5 = strongly agree
Is talkative
Prefers work that is routine
Tends to find fault with others
Is outgoing, sociable
Does a thorough job
Is sometimes rude to others
Is depressed, blue
Makes plans and follow through with them
Is original, comes up with new ideas
Gets nervous easily
Is reserved
Likes to reflect, play with ideas
Is helpful and unselfish with others
Has few artistic interests
Can be somewhat careless
Likes to cooperate with others
Is relaxed, handles stress well
Is easily distracted
Is curious about many different things
Is sophisticated in art, music, or literature
Is full of energy
Starts quarrels with others
Is a reliable worker
Can be tense
Is ingenious, a deep thinker
Generates a lot of enthusiasm
Has a forgiving nature
Tends to be disorganized
Worries a lot
Has an active imagination
Tends to be quiet
Is generally trusting
Tends to be lazy
Is emotionally stable, not easily upset
Is inventive
Has an assertive personality
Can be cold and aloof
Perseveres until the task is finished
Can be moody
Values artistic, aesthetic experiences
Is sometimes shy, inhibited
Is considerate and kind to almost everyone
Does things efficiently
Remains calm in tense situations
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Narcissism
DIRECTIONS: Select which response is most true of you.
A or B

Response A
I know that I am good because
everybody keeps telling me so
I like to be the center of attention
I think I am a special person
I like having authority over people
I find it easy to manipulate people
I insist upon getting the respect that
is due me
I am apt to show off if I get the
chance
I always know what I am doing
everybody likes to hear my stories
I expect a great deal from other
people
I really like to be the center of
attention
people always seem to recognize my
authority
I am going to be a great person
I can make anybody believe
anything I want them to
I am more capable than other people
I am an extraordinary person
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Response B
When people compliment me I
sometimes get embarrassed
I prefer to blend in with the
crowd
I am no better or nor worse than
most people
I don't mind following orders
I don’t like it when I find myself
manipulating people
I usually get the respect that I
deserve
I try not to be a show off
sometimes I am not sure of what
I am doing
sometimes I tell goods stories
I like to do things for other
people
it makes me uncomfortable to be
the center of attention
being an authority doesn't mean
that much to me
I hope I am going to be
successful
people sometimes believe what I
tell them
there is a lot that I can learn from
other people
I am much like everybody else
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Forgiveness
DIRECTIONS: For the following questions, please indicate your current thoughts and
feelings towards your partner who wounded you. Use the following scale to indicate your
agreement or disagreement with each of the statements. (Rate these items about the
specific event you described above).
1 = strongly disagree
5 = strongly agree
1. I’ll make him or her pay.
2. I wish that something bad would happen to him/her.
3. I want him/her to get what he/she deserves.
4. I’m going to get even.
5. I want to see him/her hurt and miserable.
6. I keep as much distance between us as possible.
7. I live as if he/she doesn’t exist, isn’t around.
8. I don’t trust him/her.
9. I find it difficult to act warmly toward him/her.
10. I avoid him/her.
11. I cut off the relationship with him/her.
12. I withdraw from him/her.
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Similarity of an Offender’s Spirituality
DIRECTIONS: In trying to get over the serious harm done to you by your partner, you
may or may not have considered how you and your partner have related to the Sacred.
For each statement, please indicate the degree to which you would disagree or agree
whether it has played a part in how you dealt with the offense by your partner.
0 = completely disagree
6 = completely agree
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Our beliefs overlap in important ways.
I thought about how similar my basic religious beliefs were to his/hers.
I thought, we are basically committed to the same belief system.
I recalled how similar we were in fundamental values.
I believe that he/she is a similar spiritual person to me.
I thought to myself that this person was a brother/sister human.
Even though our bond as humans was broken, I knew we were both the same under
the skin.
8. I reminded myself that I was no better as a person than the one who hurt me.
9. I said to myself that he/she was no worse as a person than I am.
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